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This is a hard case-and we all know 
where hard cases can take ajudge. 1 
INTRODUCTION 
On March 23, 2010, President Obama signed into law the Patient Pro-
tection and Affordable Care Act/ a broad and controversial piece of legisla-
* Professor of Law, Lehigh Univ., Bethlehem, PA. 
1. Gibson v. Manchester City Council, [1979] 1 All E.R. 972 at 976 (Eng.) (Lord 
Edmund-Davies). 
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tion that enacted sweeping changes to the health care industry. The Act, 
among its many provisions, imposed reforms on the health insurance indus-
try, expanded Medicaid, enacted changes to Medicare, introduced illness 
prevention programs, and imposed a host of penalties, taxes, and other as-
sessments on individuals and employers.3 Perhaps the most contentious pro-
vision in the legislation is the so-called individual mandate-the require-
ment, upon pain of financial penalty, that individuals obtain health insur-
ance coverage. On June 28, 2012, the Supreme Court, in National Federa-
tion of Independent Business v. Sebelius, upheld the constitutionality of the 
individual mandate.4 The Court held that the imposition of the individual 
mandate was impermissible under the commerce power but that the imposi-
tion of the mandate was a proper exercise of Congress's taxing power.5 
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority of a divided Court on 
both the Commerce Clause and taxing powers issues,6 was portrayed simul-
taneously as statesmanlike and Machiavellian by supporters and detractors 
of the decision, respectively.7 The challenge to the individual mandate en-
2. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (to be codified as amended at scat-
tered titles of the United States Code). 
3. For a succinct discussion of the scope of the legislation, see Florida v. U.S. 
Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1248-49 (lith Cir. 2011). According to a 
Treasury Inspector General report, this legislation "represents the largest set of tax law 
changes in more than 20 years." TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., REF. NO. 
2012-43-064, AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: PLANNING EFFORTS FOR THE TAX PROVISIONS OF THE 
PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT APPEAR ADEQUATE; HOWEVER, THE 
RESOURCE ESTIMATION PROCESS NEEDS IMPROVEMENT 1 (2012). 
4. 132 S. Ct. 2566,2600 (2012). 
5. I d. at 2593, 2600. Seven Justices also held that the statute's expansion of Medi-
caid was impermissibly coercive to the states and held that states could opt to decline to 
expand Medicaid eligibility without the loss of federal funds provided under existing pro-
grams. See id. at 2606-07; see also infra note 6 and accompanying text. A discussion of this 
issue is beyond the scope of this work. A related provision that prohibits a state from restrict-
ing existing Medicaid eligibility requirements prior to the establishment of its state exchange 
was not at issue in this case. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 200 I (b). 
However, Maine has asserted that the Court's holding has the result of striking down this 
related provision. See Christopher Weaver, State Moves to Strike Patients From Medicaid, 
WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 2012, at A2. 
6. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2577. The Court unanimously held that the Anti-
Injunction Act did not apply to the individual mandate. I d. at 2577; id. at 2609 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting in part); id. at 2655-56 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, JJ., dissenting). Justices 
Ginsburg, Sotomayor, Breyer, and Kagan dissented from the majority's holding that the 
individual mandate was unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause. Sebe/ius, 132 S. Ct. at 
2609 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part). Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor dissented from the 
majority's holding that the statute's Medicaid expansion provisions were unconstitutional. /d. 
7. Compare Editorial, A New Role for Chief Justice Roberts, WASH. POST, July 3. 
2012, at A16, and Julie Witcover, Editorial, John Roberts Rescued Obama-and Himself, 
BALT. SUN, July 3, 2012, at !SA, with Adam Liptak, Roberts Makes a Getaway from the 
Scorn, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2012, at A10, and William McGurn, Op-Ed., Chief Justice Rob-
erts Taxes Credibility, WALL ST. J., July 2, 2012, at A13. 
The Pundits Doth Protest Too Much 1191 
gendered the most sustained press scrutiny of a Supreme Court case, oral 
arguments included, than any case in this author's memory. Most observers 
of the litigation focused their attention on whether Congress's power to reg-
ulate interstate commerce extended to the power to compel a person to ac-
quire a good or service. The fact that the taxing power ultimately was held 
to support the mandate came as quite a surprise to many, particularly since 
the Obama Administration steadfastly denied that the individual mandate 
was a tax. 8 To proponents of a limited federal government, the relief that the 
Court limited the reach of the Commerce Clause gave way to the fear that 
the taxing power will now serve as cover for virtually limitless federal in-
trusion into the lives of Americans. 
Part I of this Article provides a detailed analysis of the individual 
mandate. The Congressional Budget Office has estimated that approximate-
ly four million individuals will be liable for the mandate, which goes into 
effect on January 1, 2014.9 The amount of liability that a particular individ-
ual will incur depends upon that individual's income, family status, and the 
national average cost of a statutorily defined level of insurance coverage. 10 
For many individuals the penalty due will be a flat amount, and for others 
the amount due will be determined as a percentage of income. In no event, 
however, will the penalty exceed the national average cost of coverage. 11 
Part II analyzes and critiques the Court's decisions with respect to the 
taxing power issues and the Court's holding that the Anti-Injunction Act, a 
threshold issue, was inapplicable in this case. The majority held, over a vig-
orous dissent, that the individual mandate was not a penalty but a tax. 12 A 
determination by the Court that the mandate is a penalty would have re-
moved the taxing power as an independent pillar of support for the exaction. 
The Court made clear that Congress may tax inaction and distinguished the 
taxing and commerce powers. 13 However, the Court's reasoning in this re-
spect failed to provide principled guidance for the classification of future 
exactions of this sort. 14 The Court also held that the individual mandate is 
not a direct tax that must be apportioned among the states. 15 The Court's 
attention to this issue was laconic and, similar to its resolution of the penalty 
versus tax issue, left many questions unanswered. 16 
8. See, e.g., Chris Good, Obama in 2009: The Individual Mandate Is Not a Tax, 
ABC NEWS (Jun. 28, 2012, 10:32 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/06/ 
obama-in-2009-its-not-a-tax/. 
9. See infra text accompanying note 79. 
10. See I.R.C. § 5000A(c) (CCH 2012). 
II. See infra note 27 and accompanying text. 
12. See infra text accompanying notes 74-94. 
13. See infra text accompanying notes 93-97, 103-04. 
14. See infra text accompanying notes 108-23. 
15. See infra text accompanying notes 98-100. 
16. See infra text accompanying notes 246-50. 
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Part III takes exception, for several reasons, to the notion that this case 
has opened the door to unfettered federal taxing authority that will tempt 
Congress to tax what it cannot regulate. The taxing power has been wielded 
often in an intrusive manner. Whether the extension of such power to the 
taxation of inactivity is more objectionable than other actions that have been 
taken regularly under this power is questionable. Congress, without much 
controversy, could have achieved the individual mandate's objective 
through alternative means. 17 Assertions that such alternative means come 
with more political accountability are dubious.18 In fact, exactions in the 
form of the mandate are highly transparent and efficient. 
The Court, however, did not recast the mandate in another form and 
examined it for what it is-a tax imposed on the failure to act in a pre-
scribed manner. As a result, future attempts by Congress to impose similar 
exactions will face several barriers. In comparison to the common forms 
taken by behavior-altering tax provisions, the transparency of exactions in 
this form will make such exactions more susceptible to traditional constitu-
tional challenges_l9 More importantly, despite upholding the mandate, the 
Court awoke long somnolent precedent. The penalty or tax issue has been 
resurrected and, given the Court's less than satisfactory analysis of this is-
sue, it is likely that particularly intrusive future enactments will be chal-
lenged as impermissible penalties.2° Finally, whether a tax is a direct tax, an 
issue that prior to this case was perceived to be more of a curiosity than a 
limiting principle, is a question that may be put to exactions that result from 
Congress's overaggressive use of its new-found power. 21 
I. THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act added § 5000A to the 
Internal Revenue Code.22 The statute requires that an applicable individual 
maintain minimum essential coverage for such individual and any depend-
17. See infra text accompanying notes 168-81. 
18. See infra text accompanying notes 187-93. 
19. See infra text accompanying notes 202-DS. 
20. See infra Subsection III.C.2. 
21. See infra notes 293-94 and accompanying text. 
22. Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 1501(b), 10106(b)(l), 124 Stat. 119, 244-49, 909-10 
(2010) (codified, as amended, at I.R.C. § 5000A (CCH 2012)). The penalty amount imposed 
by the statute was amended shortly thereafter by the Health Care and Education Reconcilia-
tion Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, §1002, 124 Stat. 1029, 1032-33 (2010) (codified at 
I.R.C. § 5000A). The statute also added § 4980H to the Internal Revenue Code. Patient Pro-
tection and Affordable Care Act§§ 1513, 10106(e). This provision imposes an exaction on 
certain employers if they either do not offer insurance coverage to their employees or offer 
coverage that is deemed inadequate under the statute. See generally I.R.C. § 4980H. The 
constitutionality of this provision was not before the Court. See infra text accompanying note 
57. 
The Pundits Doth Protest Too Much 1193 
ents who are also applicable individuals each month beginning after 2013.23 
Failure to meet this requirement for one or more months results in the impo-
sition of a shared responsibility payment.24 The statute terms the shared re-
sponsibility payment a penalty to be included with a taxpayer's income tax 
return for the taxable year that includes the month that such failure oc-
curred.25 The requirement to maintain minimum essential coverage is vari-
ously met through, among other means, Medicare or Medicaid coverage, 
individual insurance policies, or eligible employer-sponsored group health 
plans or insurance coverage.26 
The amount of the penalty due for a taxable year is the lesser of the 
sum of the monthly penalty amounts or the amount of the national average 
insurance premiums for a particular level of coverage for the applicable 
family size involved offered through insurance Exchanges.27 The monthly 
23. I.R.C. § 5000A(a). An applicable individual is an individual other than an indi-
vidual who qualifies for statutorily defined religious conscience or health ministry exemp-
tions, is not a citizen or national of the United States or a legal alien present in the United 
States, or is incarcerated. Id. § 5000A(d). Individuals whose required contribution exceeds 
8% of household income, individuals with very low income, and members of Indian tribes 
are not subject to the penalty. Id. § 5000A(e)(l)-(3). There appears to be no practical distinc-
tion between an exemption from the mandate itself and an exemption from the penalty for 
the failure to comply with the mandate. !d. However, the dissenting Justices thought that the 
existence of a separate set of exemptions from the mandate and the penalty for failure to 
comply with the mandate evidenced that the shared responsibility payment is a penalty and 
not a tax. See infra text accompanying note 82. 
24. I.R.C. § 5000A(b)(l). No penalty is imposed for gaps in coverage of less than 
three months. Id. § 5000A(e)(4). 
25. Id. § 5000A(b)(l)-(2). If the failure to maintain minimum essential coverage 
relates to a dependent of the taxpayer then the penalty is imposed upon the taxpayer. Id. If 
the individual upon whom the penalty is imposed files a joint tax return, then both spouses 
are jointly liable for the penalty. Id. § 5000A(b)(3)(A)-(B). The penalty is assessed and col-
lected in the same manner as other assessable penalties, but neither criminal penalties may be 
imposed nor criminal prosecution undertaken for failure to pay the penalty. Moreover, liens 
and levies to collect unpaid penalties are prohibited. I d. § 5000A(g). 
26. Id. § 5000A(f). The minimum essential coverage requirement will be met by the 
coverage offered by typical employer-provided group plan coverage and individual insurance 
policies. !d. Policies that will not be deemed to provide minimum essential coverage are 
those whose medical coverage is secondary to the primary purpose of the policy, such as auto 
insurance policies, credit insurance policies, and workers' compensation coverage. Id. Also, 
policies whose coverage is limited to medical treatment received at on-site medical clinics or 
for specific illnesses or diseases will also not qualify as minimum essential coverage. See id. 
§ 5000A(f)(3); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-91(c) (2006). 
27. I.R.C. § 5000A( c)( I). The national average premium is determined for plans that 
provide a "bronze" level of coverage, a level of coverage that is designed to provide benefits 
that are actuarially equivalent to sixty percent of the full actuarial value of statutorily enu-
merated benefits. !d.; 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b), (d) (2010); see infra note 36 and accompanying 
text for a brief description of insurance Exchanges. The use of the national average premium 
rather than state average premiums avoids the possibility that the shared responsibility pay-
ment violates the uniformity requirement for taxes that are not direct taxes. See infra notes 
234-36 and accompanying text. 
1194 Michigan State Law Review Vol. 2012:1189 
penalty amount is one-twelfth of the greater of a flat dollar amount or a per-
centage of income.28 The flat dollar amount is $95 per individual failure in 
2014, increasing to $325 per individual failure in 2015, and then settling at 
$695 per individual failure thereafter.29 The flat dollar amount for individu-
als under the age of eighteen is one-half of the above amounts.30 The total 
flat dollar amount penalty cannot exceed 300% of the individual amounts.31 
For example, assume that a family of six failed to maintain minimum essen-
tial coverage for all of 2014. The family consists of four members over the 
age of seventeen and two members under the age of eighteen. The flat dollar 
amount is $475.32 However, the flat dollar amount cannot exceed 300% of 
$95. Therefore, the flat dollar amount penalty that would be imposed on this 
family is $285. 
The tax base for the percentage of income penalty amount is the tax-
payer's household income in excess of the amount of gross income that is 
necessary to impose a duty on the taxpayer to file an income tax return.33 
The penalty is equal to 1% of the tax base in 2014, 2% of the tax base in 
2015, and 2.5% of the tax base thereafter.34 Refer to the example described 
above with respect to the family of six that failed to maintain minimum es-
sential coverage during the entire 2014 calendar year. The flat dollar 
amount penalty for such family is $285. Assume that the family's tax base 
for purposes of the penalty is $75,000. The penalty for 2014, under the per-
centage of income method, is $750.35 Because this amount is greater than 
the flat dollar amount, this figure is compared to the average national cost of 
coverage for a family of six offered through an insurance Exchange, and the 
lesser of the two amounts is the penalty for the taxable year.36 It is likely 
28. I.R.C. § 5000A(c)(2). 
29. /d. § 5000A(c)(2)(A), (c)(3)(A)-(B). However, this figure is adjusted annually 
for cost of living increases beginning in 2017. /d. § 5000A( c )(3)(0). 
30. /d. § 5000A(c)(3)(C). 
31. /d. § 5000A(c)(2)(A)(ii). This limitation is determined without regard to the 
reduced applicable amount for individuals under the age of eighteen. /d.; see also supra text 
accompanying note 30. 
32. ((4*$95) + (2*47.50)). 
33. I.R.C. §§ 5000A(c)(2)(B), 6012(a)(I). For this purpose, household income is the 
modified adjusted gross income of the taxpayer and all dependents that are required to file a 
tax return for the year in question. /d. § 5000A(c)(4)(B). Modified adjusted gross income is 
adjusted gross income increased by certain foreign income and tax-exempt interest. /d. § 
5000A(c)(4)(C). 
34. /d. § 5000A(c)(2)(B). 
35. ($75,000*.01). For 2014, the penalty under the percentage of income method is 
I% of the statutory tax base. See supra text accompanying note 34. 
36. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act segments the health insurance 
market into four markets: the individual market; two employer provided group insurance 
markets, the small and large group market, based on the size of the employer; and the Ex-
changes. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, §§ 1304, 1312, 124 Stat. 171, 182 
(2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 18024, 18032 (Supp. 2010)). Each state must create and 
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that the penalty will be determined by a percentage of income for families 
of moderate to moderately high income. Lower income families will likely 
be subject to a flat dollar amount penalty.37 High income families will likely 
find themselves subject to a penalty that is based on the cost of insurance 
coverage and, depending on their household income, incur the maximum 
penalty for failure to obtain insurance for a portion of the year. 38 
operate, by January I, 2014, an Exchange that offers insurance for purchase by individuals 
and employees of small employers. !d. § 1311 (b). After 2017, states have the option of al-
lowing large employers to participate in the Exchanges. /d.§ 1312(f)(2)(B). The Exchanges 
are intended to function as insurance marketplaces in which individuals have the ability to 
comparison shop for insurance products. Qualified employers may also purchase group plans 
through the Exchanges. /d. § 1311 ( d)(2). The federal government will provide funding to 
states to establish the Exchanges until January I, 2015. !d. § 13ll(d)(5)(A). Under certain 
circumstances, a state may participate in a multi-state regional Exchange or establish subsid-
iary Exchanges to operate within a state. /d. § 1311(f). A state may opt out of creating and 
operating an Exchange in which case the Exchange will be established by the federal gov-
ernment. /d. § 132l(c). Some federal and state officials believe that Exchanges in approxi-
mately one-half of the states will be federally assisted. See Robert Pear, U.S. Officials Brace 
for Huge Task of Operating Health Exchanges, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2012, at A17, available 
at http:/ /www.nytimes.com/20 12/08/05/us/us-officials-brace-for-huge-task -of-running-
health-exchanges.html?pagewanted=all&_r=O. Moreover, not everyone believes that the 
process of establishing and implementing the Exchanges will proceed smoothly. See id.; 
Editorial, 'Exchange' for the Worst, WALL ST. J., July 31, 2012, at A12, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 1000 1424052702303567704577516652566742514.html. 
Federal tax credits are provided to individuals and families whose income is below a certain 
threshold, who do not obtain insurance through their employer, and who purchase insurance 
through an exchange. I.R.C. § 36B. Section 36B appears to limit the tax credit to taxpayers 
who are enrolled in state Exchanges. See id. § 36B(b )(2). However, regulations were issued 
recently that would allow participants in federally assisted Exchanges also to qualify for the 
credit. See Treas. Reg. § 1.36B-1(k) (2012) (defining Exchange by reference to Public Wel-
fare, 45 C.F.R. § 155.20 (2010)); id. § 1.36B-2(a) (providing eligibility for credit by enroll-
ment in an Exchange); 45 C.F.R. § 155.20 (stating that the term Exchange refers to State 
Exchanges, regional Exchanges, subsidiary Exchanges, and a Federally-facilitated Ex-
change) (emphasis added). These regulations have come under attack. See Louise Radnof-
sky, Health Law Opponents Challenge Tax Credit, WALL ST. J., July 17, 2012, at A7, avail-
able at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB l 0001424052702303933704577531271643114 
572.html. Two commentators have asserted that the statute's omission of enrollment in fed-
eral exchanges as a condition for the tax credit was intentional. See Jonathan H. Adler & 
Michael F. Cannon, Taxation Without Representation: The Illegal IRS Rule to Expand Tax 
Credits Under the PPACA (Case Research Paper Series in Legal Studies, Working Paper 
2012-27, 20 12), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2106789. 
37. Very low income families are exempted from the penalty. See discussion supra 
note 23. 
38. For example, a taxpayer with household income of $6,000,000 who chooses to 
self-insure for an entire year would incur a penalty, based on a percentage of income, of 
$60,000 in 2014. It is unlikely that the national average cost of insurance would exceed this 
amount. Moreover, high income households may very well find themselves subject to the 
maximum penalty within months and, therefore, will incur no further penalty for self-
insuring during the remainder of the year. The taxpayer in the above example would incur a 
monthly penalty of $5,000. If the cost of national average cost of insurance for this taxpayer 
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In National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, the Court 
first addressed the issue of whether, for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act, 
the shared responsibility payment imposed by § 5000A is a tax. It then ad-
dressed whether the imposition of the shared responsibility payment is with-
in Congress's enumerated power to tax. 
II. NATIONAL FEDERATION OF INDEPENDENT BUSINESS V. SEBELIUS 
A. Anti-Injunction Act 
Before considering whether the above described statutory provision 
was within Congress's constitutional taxing power, the Court had to deter-
mine whether I.R.C. § 5000A imposed a tax for purposes of I.R.C. § 7421, 
the Anti-Injunction Act. This provision prohibits, subject to few exceptions, 
any "suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any 
tax ... in any court by any person, whether or not such person is the person 
against whom such tax was assessed."39 In effect, § 7421 requires that tax-
payers resolve their tax disputes in a suit for refund and provides legislative 
notice of the '"[g]ovemment's need to assess and collect taxes as expedi-
tiously as possible with a minimum of preenforcement judicial interfer-
ence. "'40 Because the shared responsibility payment does not go into effect 
is $20,000, then this taxpayer would be subject to the maximum penalty after four months 
after which no further penalty would be incurred. For the exemption from the penalty for 
gaps in coverage of less than three months, see sources cited supra note 24. 
39. I.R.C. § 7421(a). The federal district court may, among other exceptions, issue 
an injunction to prevent irreparable harm to the property rights of others in the context of a 
levy or sale of property by the IRS. See id. § 7426(b ). Moreover, third parties are expressly 
provided standing to vindicate an interest in property that has been wrongfully levied. /d. § 
7426(a). Exceptions to the statute are also provided for collection activities undertaken in 
certain cases that involve innocent-spouse relief or undertaken during the pendency of a Tax 
Court proceeding challenging federal liens and levies. See id. §§ 6015( e)( I )(B)(ii), 6330( e). 
40. Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 103 (2004) (citation omitted). No refund suit may 
be maintained unless a claim for refund has been filed with the IRS. I.R.C. § 7422(a). The 
district courts and the U.S. Court of Federal Claims have concurrent jurisdiction in any civil 
action against the United States for the recovery of any tax alleged to have been erroneously 
or illegally assessed or collected. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (Supp. 2010). The Court, finding that 
the statutory language does not limit such suits to the person against whom the tax was as-
sessed, held that a non-assessed party that had paid a tax to remove a federal tax lien from 
her property had standing to bring a refund suit. See United States v. Williams, 514 U.S. 527 
(1995). Congress has created a mechanism for taxpayers to challenge IRS action prior to 
enforcement-the U.S. Tax Court-but that mechanism is rather limited and is, almost al-
ways, a pre-assessment mechanism. If the IRS determines that there is a deficiency in the tax 
shown on income, estate, or certain excise tax returns, or if no returns were filed, then it must 
send the taxpayers a statutory notice of deficiency. I.R.C. § 6212(a). The taxpayer may then 
petition the Tax Court to review the deficiency claim within ninety days (ISO days if the 
notice is addressed to a person outside the United States) after the statutory notice was 
mailed. /d. § 6213(a). The IRS is precluded from assessing or collecting the tax in question 
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until 2014, a determination that the shared responsibility payment is a tax, 
in the absence of some exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, would have 
precluded the Court from adjudicating the case on the merits. 
The Court has carved out several exceptions to the application of the 
Anti-Injunction Act. The Court has held that proceedings whose success 
would have the effect of increasing tax revenue are not barred by the Anti-
Injunction Act.41 The Court has also acknowledged two narrow common 
law exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act. First, a pre-enforcement chal-
lenge will be countenanced if the government could not prevail under any 
circumstances and the taxpayer would suffer irreparable harm from en-
forcement action.42 Second, a pre-enforcement action is permitted if, under 
the circumstances, no other legal remedy is available.43 
It was possible for the Court, in this case, to have created another ex-
ception to the applicability of the Anti-Injunction Act. Section 5000A does 
not become effective until 2014.44 Consequently, the IRS is not yet enforc-
ing the provision and, therefore, challenges to the validity of the provision 
at this time do not impede the federal government's assessment and collec-
tion of revenue. The creation of such an exception would have allowed the 
Court to sidestep the issue of whether the financial burden imposed by § 
5000A is properly categorized as a tax, thereby triggering the application of 
the Anti-Injunction Act, or is more appropriately categorized as something 
else. The Court, however, chose to deal squarely with this issue. 
Chief Justice Roberts' opinion placed significant emphasis on the la-
bel that Congress chose to give to the shared responsibility payment. Em-
phasizing that the Anti-Injunction Act applies to suits that seek to restrain 
the assessment or collection of any tax, the Chief Justice stated that "[t]here 
during the ninety day period (or 150-day period, if applicable) and, if a petition to the Tax 
Court is filed, during the pendency of the Tax Court's proceedings. Id. In addition, as a result 
of perceived abuses by the IRS in its collection processes, Congress provided taxpayers with 
the right to an administrative hearing upon the filing of a notice of lien and prior to levy. See 
id. §§ 6320, 6330. Taxpayers may appeal the resultant determination to the Tax Court. /d. §§ 
6320(c), 6330(d)(1). Collection activity must cease during the pendency of the proceedings 
and such activities may be enjoined by the Tax Court or any other proper court. Id. § 
6330(e). Similarly, the Tax Injunction Act precludes lower federal court interference with the 
assessment, levy, or collection of any tax under state law. 28 U.S.C. § 1341. In addition, the 
Declaratory Judgment Act precludes any declaratory judgments "with respect to Federal 
taxes." 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). An exception is provided in the statute for declaratory judg-
ments relating to the determinations of the tax exempt status of certain organizations. !d.; 
I.R.C. § 7428. 
41. Hibbs, 542 U.S. at 102-12; see also E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon, 506 
F.2d 1278, 1283-85 (D.C. Cir. 1974), vacated, 426 U.S. 26 (1976). 
42. See Enoch v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. I, 7 (1962). 
43. See South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367, 378-81 (1984). South Carolina 
asserted that amendments to§ 103 of the Internal Revenue Code that limited the tax exemp-
tion for interest on certain state bonds was unconstitutional. See id. 
44. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
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is no immediate reason to think that a statute applying to 'any tax' would 
apply to a 'penalty."'45 He found the fact that§ 5000A terms the exaction a 
penalty significant because many other exactions in the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act are labeled taxes, and it is generally presumed that 
the use of one term in one part of a statute and a different term in another 
part of that statute is intentional.46 According to the Court, Congress may 
determine for itself whether a particular statutory enactment is subject to the 
Anti-Injunction Act, and the best evidence of such a determination is the 
text of the statute in question.47 Therefore, the Anti-Injunction Act can apply 
to exactions that are not considered taxes for other purposes.48 Moreover, 
the Anti-Injunction Act can apply to penalties if Congress chooses to make 
it applicable to particular penalties.49 
The Court noted that the Internal Revenue Code defines the term taxes 
to include penalties that are codified at subchapter 68B of the Code. 50 How-
ever, the shared responsibility payment is not found in subchapter 68B.51 
Although the statute itself states that the penalty "'shall be assessed and 
collected in the same manner as an assessable penalty under subchapter'" 
68B, the Court interpreted this language merely as a procedural directive to 
the Secretary of the Treasury to employ assessment and collection mecha-
nisms with respect to the penalty, similar to those mechanisms used to as-
sess and collect taxes.52 The Court, for similar reasons, also dismissed the 
argument that the language ofi.R.C. § 6201(a) requires that the penalty be 
deemed a tax for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act. 53 This provision au-
thorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to assess all taxes and parenthetically 
defmes taxes to include assessable penalties.54 The Court held that, for pur-
45. Nat'l Fed'n oflndep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2583 (2012). 
46. !d. (citing Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)); see, e.g., I.R.C. § 
1411 (CCH 2012) (imposing 3.8% Medicare "tax" on unearned income beginning in 2013); 
id. § 4191 (imposing a 2.3% "tax" on the sale of medical devices beginning in 2013); id. § 
4980I (imposing a 40% "tax" on employers providing high cost insurance coverage begin-
ning in 2018); id. § 5000B (imposing a 10% "tax" on tanning salon service providers). 
47. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2583. 
48. /d. 
49. !d. 
50. /d. Section 6671(a) of the Internal Revenue Code provides that any reference in 
the Internal Revenue Code to taxes includes the penalties imposed by provisions codified in 
subchapter 68B. Therefore, because the Anti-Injunction Act is part of the Internal Revenue 
Code, it applies to assessable penalties included in subchapter 68B. See I.R.C. § 6671(a). 
51. /d. Subchapter 68B provides for various assessable penalties that encompass a 
broad range of behaviors, including failure to file required information returns, promoting 
abusive tax shelters, and aiding and abetting the understatement of tax liability. See id. §§ 
6671-6720C. Section 5000A of the Internal Revenue Code is codified in Chapter 48 of the 
Code. See generally id. § 5000A. In fact, it is the only provision included in that chapter. /d. 
52. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2583-84 (quoting id. § 5000A(g)(l)). 
53. /d. 
54. !d. 
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poses of the Anti-Injunction Act, the shared responsibility payment imposed 
by § 5000A is a penalty and not a tax.55 Accordingly, the Anti-Injunction 
Act did not apply to bar adjudication of the issues on the merits.56 The Court 
was unanimous in this respect. 57 
With respect to the exaction's constitutional status, the Court exam-
ined whether the shared responsibility payment was, in substance, a tax or a 
penalty.58 As a result of the Court's Commerce Clause holding in the case, 
the latter categorization would have rendered the exaction unconstitutional. 
Holding that the shared responsibility payment was, in fact, a tax, the Court 
then addressed whether this tax was a direct tax, a form of tax that must be 
apportioned according to population. 59 
B. The Taxing Power 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Alita, Kennedy, and Thomas 
held that§ 5000A could not be supported as a valid exercise of Congress's 
power to regulate interstate commerce.60 Unlike the other Justices, however, 
55. !d. 
56. !d. 
57. See discussion supra note 6. The exaction imposed on certain employers for 
their failure to provide adequate insurance coverage to their employees was not at issue in 
this case. See discussion supra note 22; Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2576. This exaction, codified 
in Chapter 43 of the Internal Revenue Code, is termed an "assessable payment" in the statute, 
and is to be assessed and collected in the same manner as assessable penalties under Sub-
chapter B of chapter 68 of the Internal Revenue Code without any limitations imposed on the 
use of criminal sanctions, liens, and levies. I.R.C. § 4980H(a)-(b), (d)(!). It appears that, 
based on the Court's reasoning, this exaction also would not be subject to the Anti-Injunction 
Act. This provision was challenged along with § 5000A, and the Fourth Circuit held that 
challenges to both provisions were barred by the Anti-Injunction Act. See Liberty Univ., Inc. 
v. Geithner, 671 F.3d 391, 403 (4th Cir. 2011), vacated, 133 S. 679 (2012); see also discus-
sion infra note 60. 
58. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2594. 
59. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2598. 
60. See supra note 6. Note that the constitutionality of§ 4980H of the Internal Rev-
enue Code was not at issue in this case. See supra note 22; Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2576. This 
provision imposes an assessable payment on certain employers for their failure to provide 
adequate health insurance to their employees. See supra note 6. The Court held that the 
commerce power does not support a statutory mandate that requires individuals to purchase 
health insurance. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2593. It is not clear how the Court's reasoning with 
respect to the individual mandate would translate to the constitutionality of the employer 
mandate under the commerce power. It is arguable that, unlike the individual mandate, the 
employer mandate attaches to an employment relationship and, therefore, the mandate does 
not force an employer to engage in commerce but rather it regulates an already existing 
commercial transaction. A federal district upheld the constitutionality, on Commerce Clause 
grounds, of both the individual and employer mandates, but its decision was vacated by the 
Fourth Circuit due to the application of the Ant-Injunction Act. See Liberty Univ., Inc. v. 
Geithner, 753 F. Supp. 2d 611,635-36 (W.D. Va. 2010), vacated, Geithner, 671 F.3d at415; 
see also discussion supra note 57. Both mandates were also challenged in another case. N.J. 
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this holding did not end the inquiry for the Chief Justice.61 Instead, Chief 
Justice Roberts examined whether Congress's Article I power to lay and 
collect taxes provided constitutional support for the individual mandate. 62 
The Chief Justice's opinion relied on a well-established rule of statutory 
construction that applies in the event that a statute has two possible mean-
ings, one of which is constitutionally infirm and one of which is not.63 Un-
der this rule of construction, the courts should adopt the meaning that pre-
serves the statute's constitutionality.64 The courts should resort to '"every 
reasonable construction"' of a statute in order to save it from unconstitu-
tionality and consider any "'fairly possible"' interpretations, regardless of 
whether they are the most natural or straightforward interpretations of the 
statute.65 Despite his admission that the most natural reading of§ 5000A is 
that it espouses a command to individuals to purchase insurance, the Chief 
Justice stated that the relevant inquiry is whether the statute can be reasona-
bly interpreted not as a command to purchase insurance but as a tax increase 
on certain individuals who fail to purchase insurance.66 The dissent did not 
consider this interpretation of the statute reasonable and opined that such an 
interpretation amounted to the rewriting of the statute.67 Congress's choice 
of descriptive labels for an exaction, germane to the issue of the applicabil-
ity of the Anti-Injunction Act, is not determinative of an exaction's constitu-
tional status.68 Chief Justice Roberts, citing to several previous decisions of 
the Court, stated that the congressional description of an exaction does not 
control whether that exaction is within Congress's power to tax.69 Instead, 
the substance and practical operation of the exaction determines whether it 
fits within the confines of the taxing power.70 
Physicians, Inc. v. Obama, 757 F. Supp. 2d 502, 507 (D.N.J. 2010), aff'd sub nom. New 
Jersey Physicians, Inc. v. President of U.S., 653 F.3d 234 (3d Cir. 2011). However, the court 
dismissed the complaint for lack for standing. N.J. Physicians, Inc., 757 F. Supp. 2d at 511. 
61. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2650 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, JJ., dissenting) 
The dissenting Justices made clear that, but for the majority's holding, their inquiry would 
have ended with the commerce power. Id. 
62. /d. at 2593 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) 
63. /d. 
64. /d. (citing Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 448-49 (1830); Blodgett v. 
Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927)). 
65. !d. at 2594 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932); Hooper v. Cali-
fornia, 155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895)). 
66. !d. 
67. /d. at 2655 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
68. /d. at 2583, 2594 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.); see also infra text accompanying 
note 211. 
69. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2594-95. 
70. /d. at 2595. 
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The Chief Justice examined whether the exaction imposed by § SOOOA 
had the indicia of a tax or a penalty.71 He also examined whether the exac-
tion, if it is indeed a tax, is a direct tax that must be apportioned.72 Finally, 
Chief Justice Roberts explained the limitations on such power that justify its 
broad scope relative to the scope of the commerce power. 73 
1. Tax vs. Penalty 
In order to determine whether § 5000A imposes a penalty for the fail-
ure to obey a command or whether it imposes a tax increase on individuals 
who fail to purchase insurance, the Chief Justice set forth certain criteria to 
which he subjected the exaction in question. Several factors caused the 
shared responsibility payment to resemble a tax, the essential feature of 
which is the production of at least some government revenue: it is paid by 
taxpayers to the Treasury when they file their returns; it is inapplicable to 
low-income households; the amount due is based on factors such as taxable 
income, the number of dependents, and income tax filing status; it is codi-
fied in the Internal Revenue Code; and it is enforced by the IRS.74 The dis-
senting Justices found these features unpersuasive for two reasons. They 
disagreed that variations in the amount of an exaction are indicative of taxes 
and gave no credence to § SOOOA's codification in the Internal Revenue 
Code. 75 They pointed out that the amounts of numerous penalties are influ-
enced by the violators' ability to pay and, moreover, asserted that the 
placement of the mandate in the operative provisions of the Patient Protec-
tion and Affordable Care Act, rather than in its revenue provisions, is evi-
dence that the shared responsibility payment was enacted as a penalty.76 
Chief Justice Roberts noted that the distinguishing feature of a penalty 
is its punishment of an unlawful act or omission.77 He believed that the stat-
ute's provision of an inducement to purchase insurance need not be inter-
preted to make the failure to do so unlawful.78 The fact that no consequences 
attach to the failure to purchase insurance, other than the requirement to pay 
71. See infra notes 74-97 and accompanying text. 
72. See infra notes 98-100 and accompanying text. 
73. See infra notes 103-07 and accompanying text. 
74. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2594. Technically, the amount of the shared responsibility 
payment is not based on taxable income but on modified adjusted gross income. See discus-
sion supra note 33. 
75. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2654-55 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, JJ., dissent-
in g). 
76. /d. 
77. /d. at 2596 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (citing United States v. Reorganized CF&I 
Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. 213,224 (1996); United States v. La Franca, 282 U.S. 
568,572 (1931)). 
78. /d. at 2596-97. 
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the exaction at issue, and the fact that the Congressional Budget Office es-
timated that four million people would choose to pay the tax and remain 
uninsured belie that Congress intended the failure to obtain insurance to be 
considered unlawful. 79 The dissent remonstrated against this interpretation 
on what fairly can be described as formalistic grounds. In the dissenting 
Justices' opinion, the ubiquitous use of the terms "requirement," "shall," 
and "penalty" throughout the statute expressed a clear congressional deci-
sion to render the failure to obtain health insurance unlawful.80 Moreover, 
the dissent asserted that the Court has never categorized as a tax what Con-
gress has called a penalty because the term "penalty" by itself implies that 
the thing penalized is unlawful regardless of whether there is any prohibito-
ry language in the statute. 81 The dissent also believed that the existence of 
one set of exemptions from the mandate and a different set of exemptions 
from the exaction indicated that the two were separate and distinct. 82 
The Chief Justice discussed the three characteristics of penalties that 
were set forth in Bailey v. Drexel Furniture, the child labor tax case. 83 First, 
a penalty imposes an exceedingly heavy burden regardless of the extent of 
the infraction.84 Second, penalties typically include scienter requirements.85 
Finally, penalties are enforced by agencies other than the IRS, an agency 
whose function is to collect revenue.86 The Chief Justice believed that the 
shared responsibility payment does not impose an exceedingly heavy bur-
den because, for most individuals, the amount due will be far less than the 
79. !d. at 2597. 
80. !d. at 2652 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
81. !d. at 2653. 
82. !d. For a description of which individuals are exempt from the requirement to 
obtain insurance and which individuals are exempt from the shared responsibility payment, 
see discussion supra note 23. The dissent also found the government's argument on the 
briefs and in prior litigation to be inconsistent with this position. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2653-
54. 
83. In Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (Child Labor Tax Case), the Court held that a 
statute enacted in 1919 that imposed a 10% excise tax on the net profits of an enterprise that 
employed children was unconstitutional. 259 U.S. 20 (1922). According to the Court, the tax 
was, in reality, a penalty. !d. at 44. This case was decided approximately four years after 
Hammer v. Dagenhart, in which the Court held that it was not within Congress's power to 
regulate interstate commerce to enact a ban on the interstate transportation of goods manu-
factured with the use of child labor. 247 U.S. 251 (1918), overruled by United States v. Dar-
by, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (one of a series of cases that expanded the scope of the commerce 
power after the so-called "switch in time that saved nine" in the New Deal era). The situation 
in Drexel Furniture is analogous to this case in that the taxing power was posited as justifica-
tion for a legislative action that was not supportable by the commerce power. A companion 
case, Bailey v. George, was not decided on the merits. 259 U.S. 16 (1922). The Court held in 
that case that the Anti-Injunction Act prohibited the issuance of an injunction that prevented 
the assessment and collection of the tax. !d. at 20. 
84. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2595 (opinion of Roberts, J.). 
85. !d. 
86. !d. 
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cost of insurance and can never exceed the cost of such insurance. 87 Conse-
quently, individuals are left with the reasonable choice of paying the exac-
tion and foregoing insurance.88 Section 5000A imposes no scienter require-
ment and the exaction it imposes is assessed and collected by the IRS 
through normal means. 89 Moreover, the fact that the statute prohibits the use 
of criminal sanctions, liens, and levies further supported the categorization 
of the shared responsibility payment as a tax.90 Both the fact that the task of 
enforcing the exaction was given to the IRS and the mandate's lack of a 
scienter requirement were dismissed by the dissent, which pointed out that 
the IRS enforces numerous penalties and that strict liability penalties are 
common.91 
In addition to the moniker used by Congress to categorize an exaction, 
two other factors were deemed irrelevant by the majority with respect to 
Congress's power to tax-an objective to alter behavior and inactivity as the 
occasion to tax.92 According to the Chief Justice, exactions that seek to in-
fluence behavior are unremarkable and are not determinative of the consti-
tutional status of such exactions.93 Numerous tax provisions seek to alter 
behavior.94 More importantly, he made clear that, despite its inability under 
its commerce power to penalize inaction, Congress has the power to tax 
inaction.95 The Chief Justice believed that the express constitutional authori-
ty to impose direct taxes--capitation taxes in his opinion-provides support 
for the notion that Congress may, if it chooses, tax inaction.96 The extent of 
Chief Justice Roberts' support for such a power is evidenced by his state-
ment that the imposition of a $50 tax on the owner of a home that lacks en-
ergy efficient windows would pass constitutional muster.97 It is noteworthy 
that the dissent did not object to the proposition that Congress has the power 
87. !d. at 2595-96. For a discussion of the statutory cap on the amount of the shared 
responsibility payment, see supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
88. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2596. It is questionable whether those individuals that are 
subject to the national average insurance cost cap would, indeed, have a choice among rea-
sonable alternatives. For example, it appears irrational for an individual to elect to pay 




91. /d. at 2654-55 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
92. /d. at 2596,2599 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) 
93. /d. at 2596. 
94. See, e.g., id. 
95. /d. at 2599. 
96. /d. The Chief Justice's equation of direct taxes with taxes on inactivity is not 
entirely convincing. A capitation tax cannot be avoided and does not, nor can it, alter behav-
ior if suicide is excluded as a tax planning device. In contrast, a tax on inaction seeks to alter 
behavior. See infra notes 253-73 and accompanying text for a discussion of direct taxes. 
97. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2597-98. 
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to tax inaction. The dissent took issue with the characterization of the shared 
responsibility payment as a tax, but it did not discuss whether a tax on the 
failure to purchase insurance is, in fact, permissible. Drawing inferences 
from what is unsaid is usually unwise but a plausible inference can be 
drawn that the power to tax inaction was supported by all nine Justices. 
2. Direct Taxes 
The Chief Justice also pithily addressed the question of whether the 
shared responsibility payment, now considered a tax for constitutional pur-
poses, is a direct tax that must be apportioned among the states. Chief Jus-
tice Roberts relied on the sparse Court precedent in this respect and held 
that direct taxes are limited to capitation taxes, taxes on real property, and 
taxes on personal property.98 According to the Chief Justice, capitation taxes 
are imposed on "every person 'without regard to property, profession, or 
any other circumstance. "'99 The shared responsibility payment is triggered 
by specific circumstances-a certain level of income and the failure to ob-
tain health insurance-and is not, therefore, a capitation tax. Because the 
exaction is also not a tax on real or personal property, it is not a direct tax 
that must be apportioned among the states. The dissenting Justices reached 
no conclusion in this matter but they did criticize the majority's laconic 
inquiry into this issue. 100 
3. Justification for an Expansive Taxing Power 
As noted above, the Chief Justice held that Congress has the power to 
tax inactivity despite its lack of power to regulate inactivity under the 
Commerce Clause. 101 However, according to the Chief Justice, there are 
limits to the taxing power. 102 "We have nonetheless maintained that 'there 
comes a time in the extension of the penalizing features of the so-called tax 
when it loses its character as such and becomes a mere penalty with the 
98. /d. at 2598. Note that the Court in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. (Pol-
lock I) and Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. (Pollock II) held that a tax on income 
derived from real and personal property, respectively, was a direct tax that must be appor-
tioned among the several states. 157 U.S. 429, 580-83 (1895); 158 U.S. 601, 618 (1895). The 
Sixteenth Amendment, ratified in 1913, authorized the imposition of a tax on income from 
all sources without apportionment. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI; see infra notes 283-94 and 
accompanying text. 
99. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2599 (quoting Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 
171, 175 (1796) (emphasis omitted)). 
100. /d. at 2655 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
101. /d. at 2599 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) 
102. /d. 
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characteristics of regulations and punishment. "'103 In other words, the fact 
that this particular exaction passed muster does not assure a similar result 
for future exactions of this sort. Chief Justice Roberts proceeded to note that 
the power to tax is benign in comparison to the power to regulate because 
the latter power is accompanied by the full federal arsenal of enforcement 
mechanisms whereas the former power can do no more than impose a fi-
nancial exaction. 104 The dissenting Justices believed that one of the most 
significant checks on the taxing power is political in nature. 105 The framers 
of the Constitution required that tax measures originate in the House of 
Representatives, the body most susceptible to the political repercussions 
that result from the enactment of tax increases}06 In the dissenting Justices' 
opinion, the judicial rewriting of the statute by the majority resulted in a tax 
increase that was imposed upon the people by the least political branch of 
the government. 107 
C. Analysis 
The majority opinion made clear that the taxing power can support an 
exaction that Congress has chosen to label a penalty, that taxes may be im-
posed on inaction, and that direct taxes are limited to capitation taxes and 
taxes on real and personal property .108 However, the majority failed to pro-
vide principled guidance for determining whether an exaction is, in sub-
stance, a tax or a regulation in the form of a penalty. It is not clear how 
much weight is to be given to each of the particular attributes that, accord-
ing to the majority, caused the shared responsibility payment to resemble a 
tax. For example, in a footnote to the opinion, the Chief Justice, addressing 
the objections of the dissent, admitted that the enlistment of the IRS as the 
enforcement agency and the lack of a scienter requirement do not, per se, 
qualify an exaction as a tax but are merely suggestive of this status. 109 
Moreover, it is unclear whether the majority believed that the use of taxable 
income, filing status, and other income tax concepts as metrics used in the 
determination of the amount of an exaction is similarly suggestive or is, 
instead, something more. 110 
The Chief Justice took pains to point out that formalistic niceties are 
not outcome determinative with respect to whether an action is constitution-
103. /d. at 2599-600 (quoting Dep't of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 
767, 779 (1994)). 
104. !d. at 2600. 
105. /d. at 2655 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
106. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 7, cl.l. 
107. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2655. 
108. See supra notes 74-99 and accompanying text. 
109. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2596 n.9 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.). 
110. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
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ality permissible. 111 Yet, it seems quite formalistic for the identity of the 
agency selected to enforce the exaction and the metrics upon which such 
exaction is determined to have significant constitutional consequences. Ac-
cording to Chief Justice Roberts, the use of the IRS to enforce an exaction is 
evidence that the exaction is a tax, and the use of another agency to enforce 
the exaction is evidence that exaction is a penalty. 112 The fact that the IRS is 
enlisted as the enforcement agency for an exaction that applies to a broad 
segment of the population simply may reflect that it has a well-developed 
infrastructure to undertake such a task. A number of penalties are enforced 
by the IRS and not all of them relate to tax-related failures by taxpayers. 113 
Other agencies routinely collect funds from their charges-the SEC and the 
FDA, for example-and it may come to pass that, given the ubiquity of on-
line information filing, other agencies will enforce taxes on products or ser-
vices that fall within their jurisdiction. 114 Likewise, as the dissent noted, the 
fact that a penalty is based on income or other affordability factors is unre-
markable.115 If such factors are impactful at the margins then this fact should 
have been made clear. 
The majority stated that the distinguishing feature of a penalty is its 
punishment for an unlawful act and held that § SOOOA need not be read to 
make unlawful the failure to obtain health insurance. 116 According to the 
majority, both the fact that no consequences, other than the exaction itself, 
attach to such failure and the fact that it had been estimated that four million 
individuals would choose to forego insurance in favor of the shared respon-
sibility payment supported the notion that the statute did not render the fail-
ure to obtain insurance unlawful. 117 However, the majority also noted that 
Ill. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2583,2593-94. 
112. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
113. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 5871 (CCH 2012) (imposing penalties for various violations 
with respect to possession, reception, or transportation of firearms); id. § 6711 (imposing a 
penalty on tax-exempt organizations that offer to sell information or services without disclo-
sure that such information or services are readily available at nominal or no charge from the 
federal government); id. § 6720A (imposing a penalty on any person who knowingly resells 
certain fuel that fails to meet Environmental Protection Agency specifications). 
114. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78ee(a) (Supp. 2010); 21 U.S.C. § 379f(a) (2006). 
115. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
116. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text. In Bailey v. Drexel Furniture 
(Child Labor Tax Case), however, the Court held that the child labor tax was a penalty de-
spite the fact that the Court admitted that the statute at issue did not render the employment 
of child labor an unlawful act. 259 U.S. 20 (1922). "Although Congress does not invalidate 
the contract of employment or expressly declare that the employment within the mentioned 
ages is illegal, it does exhibit its intent practically to achieve the latter result .... " /d. at 38 
(emphasis added). Note that the expansion of the commerce power during the New Deal era 
made the specific issue of whether one could penalize child labor a moot point. See supra 
note 83. 
117. See supra text accompanying note 79. The dissent believed that the statutory 
language made the failure to obtain insurance unlawful because, in large part, it used the 
The Pundits Doth Protest Too Much 1207 
penalties impose an exceedingly heavy burden on those to whom they apply 
regardless of the extent of the infraction. 118 It is not clear how these factors 
interrelate, if at all. For example, does the imposition of an exceedingly 
heavy burden, by itself, overcome the fact that this burden is the only con-
sequence of the failure to meet a statute's strictures? 
Moreover, the term "exceedingly heavy burden"119 is an invitation to 
litigation because it is susceptible to various meanings. The Chief Justice 
noted that the shared responsibility payment is modest and can never exceed 
the cost of insurance, as defined in the statute. 120 However, it is difficult to 
imagine that any rational person who is faced with the choice of either pay-
ing $10,000 to the IRS and receiving nothing in return or paying $10,000 to 
an insurance provider and obtaining insurance coverage for herself and her 
family would choose the former course of action. The statute often will 
leave higher income taxpayers with no rational choice among alternatives-
a logical interpretation of the term "exceedingly heavy burden" and one 
seemingly embraced by the Court. 121 
The notion that an exaction whose amount is determined without re-
gard to the extent of the infraction resembles a penalty is, frankly, perplex-
ing. In Drexel Furniture, the fact that the child labor tax statute imposed a 
10% income tax regardless of whether one child or five hundred children 
were employed was a contributing factor in persuading the Court to hold 
that the statute was punitive in character. 122 However, this particular attrib-
ute of an exaction is ambiguous at best. For example, the federal excise tax 
on cigarettes will result in the imposition of a greater exaction on a person 
purchasing two packs of cigarettes per day than the exaction that is imposed 
on a person purchasing two packs per week. On the one hand, the tax rea-
word "shall" and words of similar import, thereby indicating Congress's intent to impose a 
duty on individuals to purchase insurance and, therefore, evidencing that the failure to do so 
is unlawful. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. For example, § 5000A(a) states that 
"[a]n applicable individual shall for each month ... ensure that the individual ... is covered 
under minimum essential coverage for such month." I.R.C. § 5000A(a). However, it is diffi-
cult to embrace such formalistic reasoning in the absence of any legal consequences, other 
than the exaction itself, for such failure. Congress could have removed any language that 
suggested that there is a duty to purchase insurance and merely imposed the exaction upon 
individuals who were uninsured. Section 5000A(a) could have been eliminated and the 
shared responsibility subsection-5000A(b}-redesignated as §5000A(a) with no legal effect 
whatsoever. The attachment of constitutional consequences to language that has no practical 
effect is, arguably, the elevation of form over substance to an extreme degree. 
118. See supra text accompanying note 84. 
119. Nat'l Fed'n oflndep. Bus. V. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566,2595 (2012) 
120. See supra text accompanying note 87. 
121. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. For an analysis of the determination 
of the amount of the shared responsibility payment, see supra notes 27-38 and accompany-
ing text. 
122. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture (Child Labor Tax Case), 259 U.S. 20, 36 (1922). 
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sonably can be interpreted as a penalty on smokers, and the heavy smoker is 
behaving in a more deleterious fashion than the casual smoker, thereby in-
curring a greater penalty. On the other hand, the tax reasonably can be in-
terpreted as just that, an excise tax that raises revenue based on purchases. 
The ambiguity inherent in this characteristic is evident in the workings of 
the individual mandate. On the one hand, the application of this reasoning to 
the shared responsibility payment could yield the conclusion that such pay-
ment is a penalty because, in many cases, the exaction will not vary with the 
extent of the infraction. On the other hand, the liability imposed by the indi-
vidual mandate will often vary based on the extent of the infraction. For 
example, the amount of the shared responsibility payment will be the same 
for a very high income individual regardless of the number of months in the 
year that such person is uninsured, but for other individuals, the amount due 
will vary depending upon the number of months that such individuals are 
uninsured. 123 
Chief Justice Roberts supported his assertion that Congress's taxing 
power extends to the taxation of inactivity by noting Congress's express 
constitutional authority to levy direct taxes, specifically capitation taxes. 124 
According to the Chief Justice, such taxes are the paradigm tax on inactivity 
because they are taxes "that everyone must pay simply for existing."125 
There are two reasonable objections to this assertion, however. First, a tax 
imposed for merely existing is not the same thing as a tax imposed on inac-
tion. The former does not seek to alter behavior and, I surmise, would be 
seen by many as less intrusive than the latter. The obligation to pay a capita-
tion tax reasonably can be viewed as a citizen's obligation to support the 
government and nothing more. It should come as no surprise if the obliga-
tion to pay a tax resulting from the failure to behave as the government 
mandates one to behave is found by many citizens to be more objectionable 
than a capitation tax. More importantly, direct taxes, although clearly con-
123. The shared responsibility payment is triggered by a failure to maintain minimum 
essential coverage and the annual amount is often determined by the sum of the penalties 
imposed on monthly failures to obtain proper coverage. See supra note 24 and accompanying 
text. However, the amount of the penalty is capped at the average national cost of insurance 
coverage. See supra text accompanying note 36. Therefore, a very high income individual 
may reach the cap after the imposition of one month's penalty and, consequently, will incur 
no further penalty for failing to obtain insurance during the remainder of the year. See supra 
notes 23-24, 38 and accompanying text. Moreover, in limited circumstances, individuals 
who are underinsured will be subject to the same penalty as individuals who are uninsured. 
Generally, employer-provided group coverage and individual health insurance policies will 
provide minimum essential coverage. However, certain individuals could have limited medi-
cal coverage-for example, specific illness coverage-that will not satisfy the mandate. See 
discussion supra note 26. 
124. Nat'l Fed'n oflndep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2599 (2012); see also 
supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
125. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2599. 
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stitutional, are subject to apportionment among the states-a very signifi-
cant impediment to their utility. 126 The analogy to direct taxes may very well 
weaken the Chief Justice's argument if the apportionment requirement is 
taken as evidence that the Constitution makes the imposition of taxes on 
inactivity very difficult. 
Moreover, Drexel Furniture, on which the Chief Justice placed signif-
icant reliance in ascertaining the distinguishing features of a penalty, is not 
particularly helpful in this regard. 127 In that case, the Court actually reframed 
the statute that imposed a tax on child labor as one that imposed an exaction 
for the failure to behave in a specified manner. 128 
If it were an excise on a commodity or other thing of value, we might not be per-
mitted under previous decisions of this court to infer solely from its heavy burden 
that the act intends a prohibition instead of a tax. But this act is more. It provides a 
heavy exaction for a departure from a detailed and specified course of conduct in 
business. That course of business is that employers shall employ in mines and 
quarries, children of an age greater than 16 years; in mills and factories, children of 
an age greater than 14 years, and shall prevent children of less than 16 years in 
mills and factories from working more than 8 hours a day or 6 days in the week. 129 
Thus, a tax on the use of child labor became, according to the Court, 
an exaction on the failure to employ workers of an appropriate age and, 
thus, a penaltyY0 This sort of verbal legerdemain would support the charac-
terization of the cigarette excise tax as an exaction for the failure to not 
smoke. It would have been helpful had the Court addressed Drexel Furni-
ture in this respect. For example, it is possible that most, if not all, excise 
taxes can be recharacterized as an imposition for the failure to behave in a 
specified manner and, therefore, the distinction between taxing action and 
inaction is a distinction without a difference. My point is not to disagree 
with the Chief Justice's conclusion with respect to the power to tax a failure 
to act but merely to point out that his reasoning in this respect was not en-
tirely satisfactory. 
The majority opinion supported an expansive taxing power due, in 
part, to its benign nature relative to the commerce power. 131 A mandate 
sanctioned under the Commerce Clause would empower the government to 
unleash a host of enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance, whereas 
the taxing power has only one weapon in its enforcement arsenal-financial 
exactions. 132 This view of the taxing power appears to be more of a justifica-
tion of, rather than a limitation on, its broad scope. After all, it is precisely 
126. See infra notes 253-56 and accompanying text. 
127. See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text. 
128. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (Child Labor Tax Case), 259 U.S. 20, 36 (1922). 
129. !d. (emphasis added). 
130. !d. at 39-49 
131. Nat'! Fed'n oflndep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566,2600 (2012). 
132. See supra text accompanying note I 04. 
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in situations in which Congress cannot resort to non-tax enforcement mech-
anisms that it will be inclined to resort to the taxing power to achieve what 
it could not achieve by other means. The fact that an action's consequences 
are less draconian than the consequences of alternative actions is hardly 
support for the permissibility of an action. This sort of justification is famil-
iar to most parents from a child's protestation that "I know what I did was 
wrong, but you should be happy that I didn't do (fill in the blanks)." The 
Chief Justice may have underestimated the power to tax. After all, long ago 
the Court itself acknowledged the force of a sovereign's taxing power. 
Chief Justice Marshall stated "[t]hat the power of taxing ... may be exer-
cised so as to destroy it ... is too obvious to be denied."133 
It is likely that the taxing power issues raised in this case will surface 
with more regularity now that the Court has held that individuals cannot be 
compelled to enter into commerce through Congress's power to regulate 
interstate commerce. 134 Part III posits that the notion that the Court has un-
moored the taxing power from any meaningful constitutional restriction is, 
for several reasons, unduly pessimistic. The discomfort caused by taxes that 
are imposed on inactivity is unwarranted. Congress can achieve, and has 
achieved, the same result in alternative ways. In comparison to what has 
gone before, the individual mandate is benign in its intrusiveness. Moreo-
ver, the ability to impose exactions for the failure to act is not an invitation 
to Congress to seek political cover and disguise its actions. To the contrary, 
such exactions are transparent and politically toxic. Despite the Court's 
holding with respect to the individual mandate, constitutional limitations on 
the taxing power have not been gutted. The transparency of taxes that take a 
form similar to the mandate assures that Congress cannot utilize such taxes 
with impunity. Such exactions will be susceptible to attack on traditional 
constitutional grounds. In addition, rather than end the tax versus penalty 
debate, the Court has resurrected it. Finally, the direct tax clauses very well 
may have continued vitality. 
133. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 427 (1819). 
134. Much of the Commerce Clause debate over the individual mandate centered on 
the precise contours of what the statute sought to regulate and whether the decision to forego 
insurance could be interpreted as the commercial activity to self-insure. Compare Sebelius, 
132 S. Ct. at 2589 n.6 (refusing to categorize the failure to insure as a self-insurance transac-
tion), with id at 2622 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part) (considering the failure to insure as a 
self-insurance activity). It is also likely that whether a statute seeks to compel individuals to 
engage in commerce or merely regulates existing commercial transactions will be the subject 
of future litigation. For example, the statute's mandate that certain employers provide their 
employees with a minimum level of health insurance coverage raises the question of whether 
this mandate forces such employers to engage in commerce or merely regulates existing 
commercial transactions-the employment agreements. See supra note 22 and accompanying 
text. 
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III. LIMITATIONS ON TAXING INACTION 
In today's media saturated world, exaggerated views of the importance 
of, and the consequences stemming from, an event or occurrence often are 
given prominence over more nuanced and reasoned opinions. The enor-
mous-perhaps unprecedented-media coverage of this case resulted, as 
would be expected, in a variety of opinions about the decision to uphold the 
individual mandate, some of which ascribed teleological dimensions to the 
decision. 135 Included among the pundits' comments was that the Court's 
imprimatur on the use of the taxing power to support the individual mandate 
"has confirmed that there are no limits to regulatory taxation as long as the 
revenue is deposited in the U.S. Treasury."136 Before examining whether 
such an assertion is reasonable or Malthusian, it is helpful to put this deci-
sion in context. 
A. The Individual Mandate in Context 
Congress has used its taxing power to intrude on the affairs of taxpay-
ers from the inception of the republic. Chief Justice Roberts' statement that 
"taxes that seek to influence conduct are nothing new" can be described 
fairly as an understatement. 137 Our current tax system is intrusive at its core. 
I use the term "intrusive" purposely to avoid labeling a particular provision 
either as an incentive or as a penalty because of the protean nature of such 
terms. Whether a particular provision is considered an incentive rather than 
a penalty depends on the baseline from which the effects of a particular pro-
vision are measured. For example, if the baseline point of reference is the 
tax base as it existed prior to the enactment of a provision, then whether a 
provision is an incentive or a penalty will turn on whether the provision 
decreases or increases a person's tax liability in comparison to the tax liabil-
ity that would have been incurred prior to the enactment of the provision. 
135. See, e.g., Editorial, A Vast New Taxing Power, WALL ST. J., July 2, 2012, at 
AIO. 
136. Paul Moreno, Op-Ed., A Short History of Congress's Power to Tax, WALL ST. J., 
July 7, 2012, at Al3. 
137. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2596 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.). Other provisions in the 
legislation are, arguably, more intrusive than the individual mandate. For example, one pro-
vision requires health insurers to provide rebates to group and individual policy holders if 
such insurer's non-claims-related costs exceed 20% of its total costs. !d. Perhaps insurance 
companies need to reduce their overhead costs, but whether the federal government is best 
positioned to determine what constitutes excessive overhead and mandate a consumer reme-
dy in the event an insurance company fails to comply with its dictate is questionable. See 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,§ 2718 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-18 (Supp. 
2010)). In addition, the mandate that employers provide coverage for contraceptive services, 
a result of executive action implementing the legislation, has proven extremely controversial. 
See infra note 205. 
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However, if the baseline is determined on normative grounds, then the cate-
gorization of a provision will be influenced by the definition of the norma-
tive tax base. Any deviation, plus or minus, from that base will determine 
whether the provision is an incentive or penalty. 138 
Federal taxes intrude, to a breathtaking extent, on human affairs. Of 
course, the mere existence of federal taxes influences behavior in a general 
way because whatever amount a person turns over to the federal govern-
ment necessarily diminishes the amount that such person has available for 
consumption or investment according to her preferences. However, the tax-
ing power has more specific influences. The following discussion is but a 
brief description of a small sample of such intrusions. Federal taxes intrude 
on the terms of employment in various ways. Payroll taxes increase the cost 
oflabor, thereby influencing employers' hiring decisions and wage levels. 139 
Limitations on tax deductions influence the structure of executive compen-
sation and the exclusion from income of certain forms of compensation 
skews the composition of employee compensation generally. 14° Federal tax-
es also influence to a significant extent savings and investment choices. 
Disparate tax treatment of various forms of income derived from capital 
favor equity investments over debt, state and local debt over other debt, and 
138. For discussion of this point, see infra notes 170-71 and accompanying text. 
139. For example, a 6.2% tax on a statutorily determined base amount of wages and a 
1.45% tax on all wages is imposed on an employer for old age, survivor, and disability insur-
ance (Social Security) and Medicare, respectively. See I.R.C. § 3111 (b) (CCH 20 12). More-
over, a very limited payroll tax is imposed upon employers to fund federal unemployment 
benefits. See id. §§ 3301-3302. A tax is also imposed on employees in similar amounts. See 
id. § 310 I. However, a temporary payroll tax holiday that expired on December 31, 2012 
reduced the tax rate applicable to employee Social Security contributions to 4.2%. Middle 
Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-96, § 1001, 126 Stat. 156, 
158-59 (2012); Tax Relief, Unemployment Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of2010, 
Pub. L. No. 111-312, § 60 I, 124 Stat. 3296, 3309-10 (20 I 0). 
140. Limits are imposed on the ability of publicly held corporations to deduct execu-
tive compensation expenses. Compensation in excess of$1,000,000 paid by a publicly-traded 
corporation to the chief executive officer or the four highest paid officers other than the chief 
executive is not deductible. I.R.C. § 162(m)(l)-(3). However, performance-based compensa-
tion is not subject to this limitation. !d. § 162(m)(4)(A)-(B). Section 162(m) had, and contin-
ues to have, the effect of shifting top level executive compensation toward equity-based 
compensation. The American Jobs Creation Act of2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 885(a), 118 
Stat. 1418, 1634-41 (2004), added § 409A to the Internal Revenue Code to curb deferred 
compensation practices that were perceived as abusive. The statute imposes certain opera-
tional and design requirements on deferred compensation plans within its scope. Section 
409A(a)( I) requires that all compensation deferred under the plan for the taxable year and all 
preceding taxable years be included in gross income during the taxable year in which the 
deferred compensation plan fails to meet the requirements specified in the statute. I.R.C. § 
409A(d)(5). The fact that certain forms of compensation are tax exempt influences the man-
ner in which employees are compensated. For example, among other employee benefits, 
employer-provided health insurance and a limited amount of educational assistance are not 
taxable to employees. See id. §§ 106, 127 (2006). 
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investment in housing over other forms of personal consumption. 141 Federal 
taxes also intrude on areas that are traditionally seen as state matters, such 
as the form in which business is conducted. 142 Foreign policy or foreign 
trade objectives are also aided by tax provisions. 143 
In addition to economic matters, the taxing power has supported intru-
sions into the most personal aspects of individuals' lives. Whether a person 
is married, has children, or adopts children has significant effects on that 
person's tax liability. 144 Federal estate taxes play an enormous role in the 
decision to whom to leave one's assets upon death. 145 Decisions concerning 
the education of one's children, whether to buy or rent a home, what type of 
car to drive and appliances to use are, to different extents, influenced by the 
Internal Revenue Code. 146 In the broadest sense, the mere existence of an 
141. Capital assets, including stock, are subject to favorable tax rates upon their sale 
or exchange at a gain provided that such assets are held for the statutorily required holding 
period so as to qualify the income as long-term capital gains. See id. § 1222(4). Qualified 
dividends are also taxed at favorable rates. Qualified dividends are dividends paid by domestic corpo-
rations and certain foreign corporations on stock that has been held for more than sixty' days and for 
which no offsetting position exists. !d. § l(h)(ll)(B)(i). Effective on January 1, 2013, the maximum 
tax rate imposed on long-term capital gains and qualified dividends increased from 15% to 20% for 
taxpayers whose income exceeds certain thresholds. The American Taxpayer Relief Act of20 12, Pub. 
L. No. 112-240, §102(b), 126 Stat 2313 (2013)(codified at I.RC. § I (h)). Note that, effective on 
January 1, 2013, dividends received by taxpayers whose adjusted gross income exceeds 
$250,000 or $200,000 for joint and single filers, respectively, will be subject to a 3.8% hospi-
tal insurance tax. /d. § 1411. Interest income received from most state and local bonds is tax ex-
empt See id. § 103(a). Up to $500,000 of gain from the sale or exchange of a principal residence is, if 
the statutory requirements are met, excludible from income. !d. § 121. 
142. Most corporations are subject to an entity-level income tax. !d. § II. Partner-
ships, however, are not subject to an entitylevel tax. /d. § 701. Limited liability companies 
are taxed as partnerships although they may elect to be taxed as corporations under Treasury 
Regulation 301.7701-3(a)-the so-called "check the box" regulations. Treas. Reg. § 
301.7701-3(a) (2012). 
143. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 199 (providing a deduction for certain domestic production 
activities); id. § 90l(j) (denying foreign tax credits for taxes paid to, among others, countries 
with which the United States has severed diplomatic relations or countries that support inter-
national terrorism); id. § 4371 (imposing a tax on certain insurance policies issued by foreign 
insurers). 
144. For example, married taxpayers are subject to a specific income tax rate sched-
ule, are eligible for certain tax-free fringe benefits through their spouse's employer, and are 
able to bequeath or gift unlimited amounts to their spouses. See id. §§ l(a), (d), 105-106, 
2056, 2523. Parents are entitled to personal exemptions for dependent children, under certain 
circumstances are entitled to tax credits due to their children, may obtain tax-free employee 
dependent care assistance, and may obtain credits for certain adoption related expenses. See 
id. §§ 24, 36C, 129, 151. 
145. For example, property bequeathed to a spouse or a qualified charity is not taxa-
ble. See id. §§ 2055-2056. 
146. See, e.g., id. § 25A (providing credits for certain educational expenses); id. § 
25D (providing a credit for solar, wind, fuel cell, and geothermal property); id. § 30B 
(providing a credit for certain alternative fuel motor vehicles); id. § 45M (providing a credit 
for certain energy efficient home appliances); id. § 163(h) (allowing a deduction for mort-
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income tax exerts some influence on the choice to either forego leisure or 
forego labor, but the tax code sometimes more pointedly affects that deci-
sion.147 
How and why we arrived at this point are beyond the scope of this Ar-
ticle but we are here and, in comparison to what has gone on before it, the 
enactment of a provision that seeks to influence a person's decision to either 
obtain or forsake health insurance appears prosaic and rather benign. For its 
critics, the malignancy in the individual mandate is not in its substance but 
in its method-taxing the failure to obtain insurance. The Court's sanction 
of such a method to achieve a policy goal opens a proverbial Pandora's box, 
thereby unleashing "'the hideous monster whose devouring jaws ... spare 
neither sex nor age, nor high nor low, nor sacred nor profane. "'148 Had the 
Court upheld the individual mandate under the Commerce Clause, the tax-
ing power issue, most likely, would have been ignored despite the fact that 
the power to tax is an independent power subject to its own limitations. 149 
Now, however, the taxing power is the linchpin in Congressional attempts 
to induce persons to engage in commerce. As a result, it is likely that occa-
sions for a more searching analysis of the scope of this power will present 
themselves. 
It remains to be seen whether the Court has expanded the taxing power 
to an extent that permits Congress to wield its taxing power unfettered by 
anything other than political limitations. Despite the protestations to the 
contrary, it is possible that this case will be seen not as an abject capitula-
tion to a federal plenary taxing power but as the catalyst for more robust 
enforcement of the structural limitations on the taxing power. The Court's 
majority did several things and failed to do one thing in National Federa-
tion of Independent Business v. Sebelius that should provide some encour-
gage interest applicable to a qualified residence); id. § 164 (allowing a deduction for property 
taxes); id. §§ 221-222 (allowing a limited deduction for student loans and tuition, respective-
ly); id. § 530 (exempting from taxation income earned in qualified educational savings vehi-
cles). 
147. In general, losses from passive activities incurred by individuals are not deducti-
ble against income from non-passive activities. A passive activity is defined as a trade or 
business in which the taxpayer does not materially participate. Consequently, these rules 
provide an incentive to owners of certain trade or businesses to either participate or not par-
ticipate in the trade or business depending on whether the activity generates income or loss-
es. See generally id. § 469. 
148. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2646 (2012) (Scalia, 
Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, JJ., dissenting) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 33, 202 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961 )). 
149. See irifra notes 233-39 and accompanying text. One prominent legal scholar 
asserts that, because taxation and regulation are close substitutes, the lack of authority to 
regulate should be accompanied by the lack of authority to tax. See Richard A. Epstein, Op-
Ed., A Confused Opinion, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2012, at A25, available at 
http://www .nytimes.corn/20 12/06/29/opinion/a-confused-opinion.html? _r=O. 
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agement to those discouraged by the outcome of the case. First, by refusing 
to sanction the individual mandate through the commerce power, attempts 
to require persons to engage in commerce must now be supported by the 
taxing power. Second, despite the fact that the Court refused to consider the 
mandate a penalty, it clearly noted that the distinction between a penalty and 
a tax has continuing vitality-which, given the case law during the past 
seventy years or so, is no small matter. 150 Moreover, the majority's insist-
ence that the label attached to an exaction is not constitutionally determina-
tive will provide support to assertions that what Congress labeled a tax is, in 
reality, a penalty. 151 Drexel Furniture itself is a case in which the Court 
deemed a penalty what Congress called a tax. 152 Substance over form cuts 
both ways, after all. Finally, although the Court dismissed the notion that 
the mandate is a form of direct tax, it did not indicate just what type of tax it 
is. 153 The Court provided some indication that it viewed the mandate as a 
form of income tax and not another form of excise tax. 154 If so, this is im-
portant for reasons discussed subsequent! y. 155 
In essence, constitutional limitations on the taxing power serve as a 
hedge against the enactment of future mandates that go too far. The value 
ascribed to such hedge depends on the extent to which one believes that 
mandates are, in some fundamental sense, different than other forms of 
taxation. If the individual mandate is perceived as nothing more than a tax 
incentive to obtain health insurance, then the mandate is quite unremarkable 
as far as tax provisions go. Perhaps one may quibble over Congress's use of 
the term "penalty" to describe the mandate. If so, any objections are over 
process, not substance, and future mandates that are referred to as taxes 
should be unobjectionable. The following discussion asserts that tax provi-
sions in the form of mandates are nothing more than the typical behavior 
modifying tax provisions to which we have become accustomed enacted in 
a different form. To be sure, mandates come with their own set of practical 
and political difficulties. However, the practical and political differences 
between traditional tax incentives and mandates should not have constitu-
tional dimensions. In fact, the transparency of mandate provisions heightens 
the potential political repercussions over their enactment. Moreover, the 
Court's reasoning in this case will make such mandates susceptible to con-
150. See supra notes 74-91 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 210-20 and 
accompanying text. 
151. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text. 
152. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
153. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text. 
154. One of the factors used by the majority in concluding that the statute's shared 
responsibility payment was, in fact, a tax was the fact that the amount of the payment was 
determined, at least in part, by income and family status-attributes that are part of the in-
come tax scheme. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
155. See infra notes 297-306 and accompanying text. 
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stitutional restrictions that, prior to this case, were more aptly described as 
curiosities rather than principled limitations. 
B. Taxing Inactivity or Activity: Are the Differences Substantive or 
Chimerical? 
We now know that Congress cannot compel persons to engage in 
commercial activities under the Commerce Clause. The Justices dissenting 
from this portion of the Court's opinion set forth a very plausible case that 
the individual mandate, "[ w ]hen viewed as a component of the entire" statu-
tory scheme, is supported by the Necessary and Proper clause as a proper 
exercise of the commerce power. 156 In fact, the Necessary and Proper clause 
supports federal mandates to engage in various forms of action that fall 
within Congress's other enumerated powers, including the taxing power 
itself. 157 It certainly is arguable that most of these forced actions are not 
commerce-filing a tax return with the IRS or fmancial information with 
the SEC-but actions are federally mandated that clearly require a person to 
engage in commerce. For example, the securities laws require publicly trad-
ed corporations to engage independent auditors to certify their financial 
statements. 158 It would appear that Congress could, if it believed that the tax 
code has grown so complex and unwieldy, legislate that all individual in-
come tax returns must be professionally prepared. 
This Article is not intended as an analysis or critique of the Court's 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, which is well beyond the scope of this 
work and this author's expertise. Congress has the power to mandate com-
merce if such a mandate is necessary and proper to the execution of an 
enumerated power other than the commerce power. It appears, moreover, 
156. Nat'l Fed'n oflndep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2625 (2012) (Ginsburg, 
J., dissenting in part). Justice Ginsburg also characterized the decision to self-insure as an 
economic decision subject to Congressional regulation. "Given these far-reaching effects on 
interstate commerce, the decision to forgo insurance is hardly inconsequential or equivalent 
to 'doing nothing'; it is, instead, an economic decision Congress has the authority to address 
under the Commerce Clause." !d. at 2617. 
157. The Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress the power to "make all laws 
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers." U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.l8. This provision is not an independent grant of authority but rather the 
authority to enact provisions '"incidental to the [enumerated] power"' and is '"merely a 
declaration, for the removal of all uncertainty, that the means of carrying into execution those 
[powers] otherwise granted are included in the grant."' Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2591 (opinion 
of Roberts, J.) (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 418 (1819); Kinsel-
la v. United States ex ref. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 247 (1960)). Various actions are mandat-
ed by the federal government in order to execute policies enacted under an enumerated pow-
er. Justice Ginsburg noted several such provisions, which included the requirement to file an 
income tax return. !d. at 2627 n.l 0 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part). 
158. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78J(a)(l)(a), 78M(a) (Supp. 2010). 
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that Congress has the power to mandate commerce when the regulated per-
son is already engaged in related commerce-for example, the requirement 
that public companies hire independent auditors. 159 This power, presumably, 
supports the constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act's employer mandate because this mandate, unlike the individual man-
date, operates on an existing commercial relationship.160 Regardless of the 
intricacies of the Necessary and Proper Clause, a sense of disquiet has 
emerged after the Court upheld the individual mandate as a tax. After all, 
Congress imposed an exaction for the mere failure to take an action whose 
undertaking the Court held was not necessary to the enforcement of a 
broader regulatory scheme. 
Does the discomfort created by the mandate evidence a fundamental 
difference between it and other forms of tax exactions, or does it represent 
an example of the behavioral effects driven by the form in which a message 
is presented? 
The tax code is riddled with provisions that seek to influence behavior, 
and the imposition of exactions for the engagement in certain forms of 
commerce passes without notice. 161 For example, imposition of a federal 
excise tax on cigarettes, 162 high cost employer-provided health insurance, 163 
and policies issued by foreign insurers 164 are transparent in their effects and 
a potential party to a taxed transaction has the choice to either forsake or 
enter into a taxed transaction. 165 
The tax code also influences behavior in ways that are less transparent 
than the imposition of a discrete excise tax on the purchase of a good or 
service. It is not so obvious that these less transparent tax code provisions 
yield substantively different results than an exaction for a failure to act. 
Whether a tax provision is an incentive to take a particular action or an ex-
action for the failure to take that action depends on the frame of reference, 
or baseline, from which the provision is examined. Why are the provisions 
that provide deductions or credits for a taxpayer's dependent children gen-
erally seen as an incentive to have a family instead of penalties for the fail-
ure to do so? Professor Jensen believes that there is a distinction between a 
tax on inaction and a tax on action and that it is a "stretch" to term the addi-
tional taxes owed that result from the failure to take advantage of an incen-
159. See supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
160. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
161. Whether such exactions are taxes or penalties is largely irrelevant b~cause such 
exactions would be supported by either the taxing power or the commerce power. 
162. See I.R.C. § 5701(b) (CCH 2012). 
163. See supra text accompanying note 46. 
164. See supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
165. The choice not to enter into a taxed transaction is perhaps a more difficult one 
for the cigarette smoker than it would be for a potential purchaser of another taxed product. 
1218 Michigan State Law Review Vol. 2012:1189 
tive as a penalty. 166 He notes, for example, that any additional tax due from 
the failure to make a deductible charitable contribution would be less than 
the amount saved from not making the contribution in the first place. 167 
Therefore, the failure to make the contribution leaves one better off on an 
after-tax basis. 168 Presumably, Professor Jensen is suggesting that if the fail-
ure to act leaves one better off on an after-tax basis, then such failure is not 
being penalized. However, the same can be said of a tax imposed directly on 
the failure to act. If health insurance would cost a family of four $6,000 in a 
given taxable year and § 5000A imposes a $695 tax on the failure to obtain 
insurance, then the failure to act increases the family's after-tax position by 
$5,305. I fail to a see a distinction, on this basis at least, between a tax pro-
vision that imposes an exaction directly on the failure to act and tax provi-
sions that impose a tax generally and provide a tax benefit for acting in a 
desired manner. 
Incentive provisions are, in reality, a combination of two legislative 
decisions. The legislated tax rates and the tax base to which such rates are 
applied must be set at a level that will support the second legislative ac-
tion-the incentives for favored activities. The rates and tax base thus set 
become the baseline from which subsequent enactments will be measured. 
The status quo ante is the logical frame of reference for a determination of 
whether a tax provision is an incentive or an additional exaction. Deduc-
tions or credits are, therefore, recognized as an incentive because they re-
duce the tax base that otherwise would apply or the taxes that otherwise 
would be owed. 
One of the most famous judicial statements ever made with respect to 
taxation reflects this sentiment. Justice Van Devanter, in New Colonial Ice 
Co. v. Helvering, stated that "[t]he power to tax income ... extends to the 
gross income. Whether and to what extent deductions shall be allowed de-
pends upon legislative grace; and only as there is clear provision therefor 
can any particular deduction be allowed."169 Any reduction in the tax base is 
a benefit conferred upon taxpayers by the Congress if one begins with the 
premise that all gross income is taxable. At this point in our economic histo-
ry, I doubt most people would subscribe to such a view because their frame 
of reference is not gross income but taxable income as it is presently de-
fined. One political commentator noted the need to establish a metric from 
which the effects of a change will be measured as follows: 
166. Erik M. Jensen, The Individual Mandate and the Taxing Power, TAX NOTES, 
Jan. 2, 2012, at 97, 103 n.56. 
167. /d. 
168. /d. It is possible, however, that an exaction whose size leaves an individual 
worse off by failing to act may be considered a penalty. See infra notes 225-30 and accom-
panying text. 
169. 292 u.s. 435,440 (1934). 
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Every day it seems, reason and the English language are ravished by contemporary 
American politics. For example, as there is no God-given tax rate, when the rate 
increases it is an increase, not the expiration of a decrease. Were it the latter, one 
could say that the Bush tax cuts were not tax cuts but the expiration of the Clinton 
increases, the Clinton increases the expiration of the Reagan cuts, the Reagan cuts 
the expiration of previous increases, and so on .... The nation appears more and 
more able to eat whatever words are shoved down its throat. 170 
Long standing deductions lead taxpayers to a sense of entitlement, 
particularly when such deductions implicate reliance interests. 171 In any 
case, some point of reference is used to draw conclusions about whether a 
change in the status quo is an incentive or penalty. On occasion, that point 
of reference may change and a provision commonly interpreted as an incen-
tive may come to be seen as penalty imposed on those who fail to qualify 
for the putative incentive. Same-sex couples, for example, generally per-
ceive that they are being penalized due to their inability to qualify for the 
various tax benefits provided to married couples as a result of the Defense 
of Marriage Act. 172 
That said, there are two substitutes for the imposition of a tax that is 
triggered by the failure to act. The issue is whether the differences, if any, 
between these alternatives and an exaction imposed on the failure to act 
have constitutional dimensions. As enacted, the individual health insurance 
mandate takes the form of a shared responsibility payment that is due only 
from certain individuals who have failed to obtain health insurance. 173 The 
statute makes explicit that it imposes an exaction for the failure to act in a 
prescribed manner. 174 Alternatively, Congress could have achieved the same 
170. Mark Helprin, Op-Ed., The Hunt for Blue October, WALL ST. J., July 26, 2012, 
at A13. 
171. The deductions for mortgage interest and real estate taxes are an example of 
long-standing deductions that have significant reliance implications. The purchase of a horne 
is a major financial investment whose related after-tax costs are considered over long periods 
of time. Moreover, it is inconceivable that state and local authorities have not factored in the 
federal tax deduction into their real estate tax rate setting process. Elimination of this deduc-
tion would have significant effects on the mortgage and real estate markets and state and 
local government budgets. 
172. The Defense of Marriage Act states that, for purposes of any federal legislation, 
marriage is defined as the "legal union between one man and one woman." 1 U.S.C. § 7 
(2006). Consequently, same-sex couples that are legally married under state law cannot file a 
joint federal income tax return, do not qualifY for tax-free fringe benefits available to the 
spouse of an employee, and cannot gift or bequeath unlimited tax-free amounts to a spouse. 
The statute has been subject to numerous legal challenges, and the Obama administration has 
chosen not to defend it. See Roberta A. Kaplan & Julie E. Fink, The Defense of Marriage 
Act: The Application of Heightened Scrutiny to Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual Orien-
tation, 2012 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 203, 209. 
173. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text. 
174. I.R.C. § 5000A(b)(l) (CCH 2012). 
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result either by reframing the legislation to provide a benefit for obtaining 
health insurance or by using a combination of its tax and spending powers. 
Assume that instead of enacting § 5000A, Congress merely amended 
§ 1 of the Internal Revenue Code, the section that sets forth individual tax 
rates, to either include a surcharge that mirrored the present section 5000A 
or altered the tax rate schedules to achieve the same result-in effect, enact-
ing a tax increase applicable to taxpayers generally. Assume further that 
Congress then enacted the new section 36AA of the Internal Revenue Code 
that provided a credit for taxpayers who obtained health insurance that 
equaled the tax increase just enacted. In substance, this regime achieves the 
same result as section 5000A. 
Alternatively, after adjusting § 1 of the Internal Revenue Code as de-
scribed above, Congress could have enacted, through its spending power, a 
rebate program administered by the Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices that provided individuals who could show proof of health insurance 
with a rebate based on certain income and family criteria so that the rebate 
amount would mirror the exaction imposed by § 5000A. Similar to the pre-
vious example, the consequences of such a scheme are similar to the conse-
quences that arise from the application of§ 5000A. 
Substantively, there is no difference between these two alternatives. 
The latter alternative provides a subsidy for health insurance directly 
through the spending power while the former does so indirectly through the 
use of a tax credit. In fact, many scholars and commentators have equated 
the use of tax incentives-so-called "tax expenditures"-with direct spend-
ing after the publication of Professor Surrey's seminal article on the subject 
in 1970. 175 From an economic standpoint, incentives provided by either di-
rect federal spending or by tax incentives are, arguably, indistinguishable 
and, in most respects, the spending and taxing powers are constitutionally 
175. See generally Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives As a Device for Implementing 
Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REv. 
705 (1970). For budget purposes, the distinction between direct spending and tax expendi-
tures has been eroded. Revenue losses attributable to tax expenditure provisions must be 
specified pursuant to federal law. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 622(3) (2006). For these purposes, 
"'tax expenditures' means those revenue losses attributable to provisions of the Federal tax 
laws which allow a special exclusion, exemption, or deduction from gross income or which 
provide a special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax liability." !d. However, 
not all commentators are convinced of the equivalence of tax expenditures and direct spend-
ing. The late Professor Boris Bittker was perhaps the leading critic of assertions of such 
equivalence. According to Professor Bittker, identification of tax expenditures requires that 
provisions necessary for the determination of the tax base be distinguished from other provi-
sions. Boris I. Bittker, Accounting for Federal "Tax Subsidies" in the National Budget, 22 
NAT'L TAX 1. 244, 252 (1969). Such distinctions are influenced by subjective beliefs about 
what constitutes an appropriate tax base. /d. at 260. "[E]very man can create his own set of 
'tax expenditures,' but it will be no more than his collection of disparities between the in-
come tax law as it is, and as he thinks it ought to be." /d. 
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similar. Both the spending and taxing powers are subject to the limitation 
that they be exercised for national defense, repayment of federal debt, or to 
advance the general welfare but, unlike the Necessary and Proper Clause, 
neither power is limited in its exercise to actions that are supported by an-
other enumerated power. 176 Moreover, both powers are limited by other con-
stitutional provisions, such as provisions in the Bill of Rights, the Four-
teenth Amendment, and principles of federalism. 177 Despite these similari-
ties, the two powers are not constitutionally indistinguishable. For example, 
the Court has distinguished between tax incentives and direct spending for 
purposes of taxpayer standing. 178 Moreover, unlike the spending power, the 
176. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. I; see, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 
(1987); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. I, 66 (1936). For a discussion of~he limitations on 
the taxing power, see infra notes 232-44 and accompanying text. Note, however, that the 
Court, in Butler, did not believe that the disentanglement of the tax and spending powers 
from other enumerated powers meant that there were no limitations on the use of such pow-
ers. 297 U.S. at 66-67; see also Nat'! Fed'n oflndep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2643 
(2012) (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, JJ., dissenting). It is possible that a narrowly im-
posed and coordinated tax and spend scheme put in place to achieve an otherwise impermis-
sible objective could be struck down. See infra note 222. 
177. Dole, 483 U.S. at 210; Butler, 297 U.S. at 69-70; Moritz v. Comm'r, 469 F.2d 
466, 469-70 (I Oth Cir. 1972). Federalism limitations on the spending power were at issue in 
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius. The Court held that the statute's 
expansion of Medicaid was unconstitutional due to the coercive nature of such expansion. 
See Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2607 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.); see also supra notes 5-6. It has 
been suggested that § 5000B of the Internal Revenue Code, added to the tax code by the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, possibly could be challenged on equal protection 
grounds because this provision, imposing a I 0% excise tax on tanning salon services, will 
apply virtually exclusively to Caucasians. See Maximilian Held, Note, Go Forth and Sin 
[Tax] No More: Important Tax Provisions, and Their Hazards, in the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, 46 GONZ. L. REV. 717, 737-38 (2011). At least one prominent scholar 
believes that Congress's attempt to impose a punitive tax on bonuses received by employees 
of AIG, the large insurer bailed out by the federal government in 2008, raises Fifth Amend-
ment Takings Clause concerns. See Jensen, supra note 166, at 104-05. See generally Erik M. 
Jensen, Would a Tax on AIG Bonus Recipients Really Be a Tax?, TAX NOTES, May 25, 2009, 
at 1033. Another prominent legal scholar has posited that the progressive federal income tax, 
because it poorly correlates the taxes it imposes with the benefits such taxes provide, should, 
in certain circumstances, be considered a taking. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE 
PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 297-300 (1985). On occasion, a tax provi-
sion may implicate constitutional issues not because of the exaction it imposes but due to the 
information that it requires taxpayers to provide. See, e.g., Marchetti v. United States, 390 
U.S. 39, 41-44 ( 1968) (holding that the information required to be provided pursuant to a 
wagering tax violated the Fifth Amendment). 
178. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, a taxpayer brought a challenge to a federal statute 
that provided financing to states in order to reduce infant and maternal mortality. 262 U.S. 
44 7, 4 79 (1923). The taxpayer alleged that the statute, by encroaching on areas that were 
traditionally the states' domain, violated the Tenth Amendment, and that the federal expendi-
tures under the statute increased her tax bill in violation of due process. I d. at 483, 486. The 
Court denied the taxpayer standing, stating that the effect of the expenditures on his federal 
tax liability was so" remote, fluctuating and uncertain" and that "[h]is interest in the moneys 
1222 Michigan State Law Review Vol. 2012:1189 
taxing power is subject to certain structural constitutional limitations. 179 
However, it is unlikely that the provision of income tax deductions or cred-
its will implicate any structural limitations to the taxing power. 180 
The fact that the individual mandate could have been enacted in a dif-
ferent form by an alternative use of the taxing power or by a combination of 
the taxing and spending powers does not suggest that there is no difference 
between the method chosen and the methods that could have been chosen. 
Practical and political implications inform the choices made by Congress. 
From a practical standpoint, a tax imposed on the failure to act in a pre-
scribed manner is, in one sense, efficient. Raising tax rates and offering an 
offsetting deduction or credit requires that both the rate structure and the 
deduction or credit mechanism be calibrated to yield results comparable to 
the results achieved by a tax imposed directly on the failure to act, a process 
whose difficulty will be proportional to the number of exceptions and other 
variables included in the provision in question. 181 Implementation of a tax 
and spend scheme will require the enlistment of another federal agency and 
of the Treasury" was "shared with millions of others." !d. at 487. In Flast v. Cohen, the Court 
created an exception for taxpayer claims of Establishment Clause violations. 392 U.S. 83, 
105-06 ( 1968). The Court allowed taxpayer standing because, in the Court's opinion, the 
framers adopted the Establishment Clause because they feared that "the taxing and spending 
power would be used to favor one religion over another or to support religion in general." !d. 
at 103. Therefore, the Establishment Clause serves as a "specific constitutional limitation" on 
Congress's power to tax and spend. !d. at 104. However, the Court has refused to equate tax 
expenditures and direct spending for purposes of applying the Flast exception. In Arizona 
Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn, taxpayers brought an action to enjoin the 
state of Arizona from issuing tax credits to taxpayers for contributions to religious School 
Tuition Organizations (STOs ). 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1440 (20 11 ). The Court held that the taxpay-
ers did not have standing to maintain the action. !d. In the Court's opinion, the Flast test was 
not met because any subsidies to religious groups that the tax credit scheme created were not 
traceable to government expenditures. !d. at 1445-47. Instead, the "contributions result from 
the decisions of private taxpayers regarding their own funds .... While the State, at the out-
set, affords the opportunity to create and contribute to an STO, the tax credit system is im-
plemented by private action and with no state intervention." !d. at 1448. Justice Kagan, in 
dissent, failed the see a distinction between tax expenditures and direct spending and be-
lieved that "targeted tax breaks ... are just spending under a different name." Id. at 1455-56 
(Kagan, J., dissenting in part). Although this case dealt with a state tax expenditure, nothing 
in the opinion suggests that the Court would view federal tax expenditures differently for the 
purposes of taxpayer standing. 
179. See infra Subsection III.C.3. 
180. See infra Subsection III.C.3. 
181. Tax incentives are often extremely complex to decipher or impose significant 
inconveniences. See John D. McKinnon, Firms Pass Up Tax Breaks, Citing Hassles, Com-
plexity, WALL ST. J., July 23, 2012, at AI. Also, it is possible, and perhaps likely, that the 
benefits of federal subsidies and tax incentives do not flow entirely to the persons to whom 
they are directed. For example, the existence of federal assistance and tax breaks for higher 
education expenditures may have resulted in an increase in tuition costs. I have no opinion if 
a tax on the failure to act would diminish, exacerbate, or have no impact on this phenome-
non. 
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the development of an infrastructure to carry out the subsidy part of the 
scheme. In another sense, however, such taxes are inefficient. Taxes im-
posed on the failure to act are difficult to enforce. The fact that many indi-
viduals' compliance with the individual mandate will be documented and 
reported to the IRS significantly aids in the enforcement of the mandate. 182 
However, most mandates will not have that luxury. Politically, either alter-
native would require Congress to vote for an across-the-board tax increase. 
It is difficult to ascertain any reason why the efficiency or inefficiency 
of a tax scheme has constitutional implications. Political differences be-
tween alternative approaches justifiably may raise constitutional concerns. 
The dissenting Justices placed significant stock in the political difficulties of 
enacting tax increases and insisted that Congress live with the "penalty" 
label it chose to give to the individual mandate. 183 Acknowledging that the 
Court often has considered an exaction that "bore an agnostic label" to be a 
tax, they emphatically noted that "we have never-never-treated as a tax 
an exaction which ... explicitly denominates the exaction a 'penalty. "'184 
The dissenters' belief that judicial deference should be given to Congres-
sional terminology when the term "penalty" is used but not otherwise sug-
gests that they believe that the use of that particular term mitigates the nega-
tive political consequences attendant to a tax increase. 185 
Assuming, arguendo, that the dissenting Justices' view in this respect 
contains some validity, such view will hold some validity for this enactment 
only. Considering the controversy surrounding this case, it is highly unlike-
ly that a future tax increase disguised as a penalty will pass without a politi-
cal brouhaha. Moreover, is the enactment of an across-the-board tax in-
crease coupled with either a concomitant deduction/credit for, or a direct 
federal subsidy to, qualified individuals more difficult politically than a 
direct tax on the failure to act? A compelling argument can be made that the 
latter is more difficult politically. A tax on the failure to act is transparent 
and, as evidenced by the public opprobrium that the individual mandate 
generated, is generally not well-received. It hardly strains credulity to be-
lieve that public opposition to a tax imposed on the failure to purchase ener-
gy efficient windows, to use the Chief Justice's hypothetical, would be less 
182. Effective in 2014, "[e]very person who provides minimum essential coverage to 
an individual during a calendar year" is required to furnish various information to the IRS 
and the covered individual. See I.R.C. § 6055 (CCH 2012). In addition, large employers 
subject to the employer mandate, described supra note 22, also must furnish information to 
the IRS for periods beginning after 2013. See id. § 6056. 
183. Nat'! Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2651, 2655 (2012) 
(Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, AI ito, JJ., dissenting). 
184. !d. at 2653. 
185. !d. at 2650-51. 
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than the public opposition to a minor tweak to tax rates coupled with a de-
duction or credit for purchasing such windows. 186 
The manner in which a provision is framed affects public opinion. 187 
The recent antitrust lawsuit settlement between credit card issuers and retail 
merchants is stark evidence of this phenomenon. 188 Prior to the settlement, 
merchants were authorized to offer cash discounts but were prohibited from 
imposing a surcharge for credit transactions. 189 Obviously, the credit card 
issuers believed that consumers perceived a difference between a cash dis-
count and a credit surcharge despite the fact that they are economically 
equivalent. 190 Imagine for a moment that an employer established a compen-
sation system whereby total compensation was determined for all employ-
ees but that such compensation was then adjusted downward for employees 
who were unmarried. Most employees would find such a scheme outra-
geous. However, most employers have compensation schemes that do pre-
cisely that by the provision of greater employee benefits to married employ-
ees.191 Thus, single employees are not penalized. Instead, married employees 
are rewarded. An explicit tax on the failure to act does not have the ad-
vantage of political cover. To the contrary, such a tax has no political cover 
because it is not reframed, as the alternative measures are, as an incentive. 192 
186. See supra text accompanying note 97. 
187. For example, whether merchants frame a promotion as a discount or as a bonus 
has significant marketing implications. See generally Haipeng (Allan) Chen et al., When 
More Is Less: The Impact of Base Value Neglect on Consumer Preferences for Bonus Packs 
over Price Discounts, 76 J. MARKETING 64 (2012). For a more general discussion of the 
behavioral aspects of consumer choice, see generally Richard Thaler, Mental Accounting and 
Consumer Choice, 4 MARKETING SCI. 199 (1985). 
188. See Robin Side!, Card Giants to Pay $6 Billion, WALL ST. J., July 14, 2012, at 
AI. 
189. See generally Adam J. Levitin, The Antitrust Super Bowl: America's Payment 
Systems, No-Surcharge Rules, and the Hidden Costs of Credit, 3 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 265 
(2005). 
190. !d. at 279-80. 
191. A standard employee fringe benefit is employer subsidized health insurance. 
Many employers provide a greater subsidy for the coverage of married employees than they 
do for the coverage of single individuals. A recent survey of employer-provided health insur-
ance benefits found that the average cost to an employer of providing health insurance to an 
employee in 2012 was $6,266 and $12,212 for single and family coverage, respectively. See 
2012 Survey of Employer-Provided Health Benefits, SAVITZ (2012), available at 
http://www.savitz.com/docs/2012_SurveyReport.pdf. A common fringe benefit provided by 
universities to its employees is free or heavily subsidized tuition for dependent children that, 
with few exceptions, is unavailable to single individuals. A rudimentary understanding of 
economics makes plain that the cost of fringe benefits is factored into the determination of 
salary levels. Consequently, single employees bear the burden of salary reductions without 
the commensurate amount of employee benefits that are available to married employees. 
192. See LUIGI ZINGALES, A CAPITALISM FOR THE PEOPLE: RECAPTURING THE LOST 
GENIUS OF AMERICAN PROSPERITY 223-24 (20 12) (arguing that framing a measure as either a 
tax or an incentive has political ramifications). 
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This intuition corresponds with predictions based on public choice theory .193 
A legislative imposition that is perceived to apply to a relatively small 
group of persons will generate greater opposition than an imposition that is 
perceived to be broad-based. 194 
C. Predictions ofthe Demise of Constitutional Impediments to Tax Are 
Premature 
Despite the fact that a tax on the failure to act should be no more ob-
jectionable than alternative tax or tax and spend schemes that achieve the 
same result, the Court gave no indication that it equates such a tax with al-
ternatives that are clearly constitutionally permissible. The Court did note 
that taxes may seek to influence behavior but it did not attempt to reframe a 
tax on inactivity as something else. 195 In fact, Chief Justice Roberts took 
pains to provide constitutional support for a tax on inaction as just that. 196 It 
appears that the Court will take such exactions in the form that Congress 
chooses to give them. The question of whether Congress "had the power to" 
do something will not substitute for the question of whether Congress actu-
ally "did so."197 As a result, there are three reasons why such a tax will not 
become a commonplace method for Congress to wield unfettered power 
over economic affairs. First, the transparency of a tax on the failure to act 
will make it more susceptible than alternative schemes to constitutional 
attacks of a traditional nature. 198 Second, such a tax may be subject to re-
characterization as a penalty-a remote possibility for other forms of tax. 199 
Third, aggressive provisions of this nature may very well run afoul of struc-
tural limitations on the taxing power-namely the direct tax clauses. 200 
1. Traditional Constitutional Impediments 
The typical method in which Congress uses the tax code to influence 
behavior is by the provision of incentives to encourage whatever behavior it 
deems desirable. Achieving the same result directly by taxing the failure to 
193. See id. 
194. See, e.g., Brian Galle & Jonathan Klick, Recessions and the Social Safety Net: 
The Alternative Minimum Tax as a Countercyclical Fiscal Stabilizer, 63 STAN. L. REv. 187, 
237-38 (2010). 
195. Nat'! Fed'n oflndep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2599 (2012). 
196. See supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text. 
197. These quotes are taken from the dissenting opinion and were made in the context 
of the dissent's examination of whether the individual mandate was a tax or a penalty. Sebe-
lius, 132 S. Ct. at 2651 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, JJ., dissenting) (emphasis omitted). 
198. See infra Subsection III.C.l. 
199. See infra notes 205-31 and accompanying text. 
200. See infra Subsection IJI.C.3. 
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act in the desired manner is more overt and thus more susceptible to consti-
tutional attack. For example, assume that Congress wants to encourage all 
men over the age of forty to undergo annual colonoscopies. Congress can 
incentivize men to do so by providing a tax deduction or tax credit for the 
cost of the procedure, and it is unlikely that many people would find such an 
incentive objectionable. However, a tax imposed on the failure to undergo 
the procedure could, quite plausibly, be challenged on substantive due pro-
cess grounds as a violation of the right to privacy.201 Likewise, a tax on the 
failure to hire a certain number of employees could be subject to First 
Amendment challenge, whereas hiring incentives routinely have been en-
acted. 202 As previously shown, there is no substantive difference between a 
penalty and an incentive that cannot be explained away by the baseline from 
which the effects of a provision are measured.203 However, whether any 
differences between alternative means to the same end are more illusory 
than real, these differences are perceived as real and important. Ironically, 
an unrelated mandate that was promulgated under the authority of the Pa-
tient Protection and Affordable Care Act is under constitutional fire-the 
mandate that employer-provided health coverage include contraceptive cov-
erage.204 
201. Cf Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,279,281 (1990) (holding 
that an individual has the right to refuse life supporting medical procedures). 
202. Although freedom of association is not a right made explicit in the First 
Amendment, the Court, in NAACP v. Alabama, held that such a right is protected by the First 
Amendment. 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958). This freedom also includes the freedom to not asso-
ciate with persons. See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 659 (2000) (holding 
that a New Jersey statute that required the Boy Scouts to admit an openly gay member was 
unconstitutional). 
203. See supra notes 168-73 and accompanying text. 
204. One objective of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act is the provision 
of preventative care for women. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act§ 1001(5) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (Supp. 2011)). Recommended guidelines were pub-
lished on August 3, 2011 that included, as part of such preventive care, contraceptive ser-
vices for women, with discretionary exemptions for certain religious employers. See Group 
Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive Services Un-
der the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 46621, 46623 (Aug. 3, 
2011) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 147 (2012)). After originally providing religious employers 
with an additional year to comply with the contraception coverage, the Obama Administra-
tion, under pressure from various religious groups, announced a compromise whereby insur-
ance companies would provide contraception coverage for employees of religious employers 
free of charge if the employers decided not to provide such coverage. See Rebecca Hall, 
Comment, The Women's Health Amendment and Religious Freedom: Finding a Sufficient 
Compromise, 15 J. HEALTH CAREL. & PoL'Y 401, 403 (2012); see also Press Release, White 
House Office of the Press Sec'y, Fact Sheet: Women's Preventive Services and Religious 
Institutions (Feb. 10, 2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/20 12/02/1 0/fact -sheet -women-s-preventive-services-and-religious-institutions. This 
compromise did not placate the religious groups opposed to the mandate, and legal actions 
were brought alleging that the mandate violated the First Amendment. See Hall, supra note 
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2. Penalty vs. Tax: Drexel Furniture Resurrected 
Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce and its power to tax 
are separate and distinct powers. However, these two powers are inexorably 
linked when it comes to the issue of whether an exaction is a tax or a penal-
ty.205 If Congress has the power to regulate an activity as commerce then 
whether it has imposed a penalty or a tax is virtually moot.206 A conse-
quence of a restrictive interpretation of the Commerce Clause is the con-
comitant heightened importance of the inquiry into the nature of a so-called 
tax. It is no coincidence that the Court's penalty versus tax jurisprudence 
reached its nadir before the New Deal expansion of the commerce power. 
Drexel Furniture was a rebuff to Congress's attempts to achieve its aim 
through the tax back door after Hammer v. Dagenhart shut the front door.207 
Once the Court, in Darby, opened the front door, Drexel Furniture became 
a curiosity, much like Lochner.208 Or so it seemed. 
204, at 403-04. A federal district court recently has granted a temporary injunction sought by 
an employer that challenged the mandate. See Louise Radnofsky, Judge Backs Catholic 
Owners of Firm on Health-Law Rule, WALL ST. J., July 28, 2012, at A3. The temporary 
injunction was granted based on statutory grounds, based on the Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Act. /d. This statute, enacted in 1993, prohibits the imposition of a substantial burden 
upon a person's free exercise of religion unless a compelling government interest for the rule 
in question is demonstrated and the rule furthers that interest by the least restrictive means. 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2006)). The law applies to all subsequent 
federal legislation unless the subsequent law explicitly states that it is excluded. /d. The 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act did not exempt itself from the application of the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act. 
205. In unusual circumstances, an exaction may be subject to attack as an unconstitu-
tional taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment. See discussion supra note 177. Also, an 
exaction may be deemed a fee. Whether an exaction is a fee or a tax could have constitution-
al consequences. Excessive executive branch discretion over taxes may constitute an uncon-
stitutional delegation of power by Congress. Moreover, fees may vary significantly among 
the constituency of an agency without raising due process, equal protection, or uniformity 
issues. An exaction is characterized as a fee if it is imposed either to compensate for benefits 
derived from an agency or to defray the regulatory costs of the agency. For a general discus-
sion of the fee versus tax issue, see Barbara A. Cherry & Donald D. Nystrom, Universal 
Service Contributions: An Unconstitutional Delegation of Taxing Power, 2000 L. REV. 
M.S.U.-D.C.L. 107, 133-37. 
206. The power to tax comes with certain structural limitations that do not apply to 
the commerce power. See infra notes 233--44 and accompanying text. 
207. See supra note 83. 
208. /d. In Lochner v. New York, the Court held that liberty of contract was a right 
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, thereby providing the 
rationale for courts to later invalidate a host of federal and state statutes that sought to regu-
late health and welfare. 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905). The case ushered in the so-called Lochner 
era, during which government power over economic matters was circumscribed. The Loch-
ner era survived until the Court took a more expansive view of the commerce power during 
the New Deal era. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding 
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The Court's refusal to countenance the expansion of the commerce 
power so as to encompass the power to compel the engagement in com-
merce has resurrected the penalty versus tax issue and infused it with new 
vitality. Although Drexel Furniture was never overruled, it lay dormant and 
there appeared to be no reason to believe it would rise from its somnolence. 
But rise it did in this case. Although the Court upheld the individual man-
date as a tax, the majority's examination of the mandate through the prism 
of Drexel Furniture assures that future enactments similar in form to the 
one at issue in this case will be challenged and closely scrutinized. 
It would not have been much of an exaggeration to have suggested, 
prior to the Court's holding in this case, that any tax is virtually immune 
from judicial interference.209 The label attached to an exaction had long been 
dismissed as a determining factor in the classification of an exaction. The 
refusal by a majority of the Court to give credence to the description of the 
individual mandate as a penalty should have come as no surprise. Descrip-
tive terms have been ignored for almost 150 years. After a licensing re-
quirement was upheld as a valid exercise of Congress's taxing power in 
1866, the courts have been consistent that the validity of a tax does not de-
pend on whether "the tax itselfbear[s] an accurate label.,z10 
Moreover, both the purpose of an exaction and the extent of the reve-
nue it is predicted to raise have also been deemed factors that are not ger-
mane to the determination of whether an exaction is supported by the taxing 
power. In United States v. Doremus, the Court acknowledged "that the fact 
that other motives may impel the exercise of federal taxing power does not 
authorize the courts to inquire into that subject."211 In Sonzinsky v. United 
States, the Court, upholding a tax on firearms dealers, was more direct, stat-
ing that the courts "will not undertake ... to ascribe to Congress an attempt, 
under the guise of taxation, to exercise another power denied by the Federal 
Constitution."212 The fact that a purported tax is projected to raise little rev-
enue, a fact that may be seen as evidentiary of a regulatory purpose for the 
exaction, has likewise drawn shrugs from the Court. For example, an occu-
Washington state's minimum wage law). This case marked a turning point in the Court's 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence and was followed by several cases that effectively eviscer-
ated the Commerce Clause as a barrier to federal action. See e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 
U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding the federal Fair Labor Standards Act); United States v. 
Wrightwood Dairy Co, 315 U.S. II 0 (1942) (upholding federal price regulations on milk); 
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. Ill (1942) (upholding the application of the Agricultural Ad-
justment Act to wheat grown for internal consumption). 
209. Of course, the determination of whether tax legislation violates constitutional 
provisions other than the Commerce Clause is unaffected by judicial expansions or contrac-
tions of the commerce power. See supra notes 202--05 and accompanying text. 
210. License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 462,474-75 (1866); Penn Mut. Indem. Co. 
v. Comm'r, 277 F.2d 16,20 (3d Cir. 1960). 
211. 249 U.S. 86, 93 (1919). 
212. 300 U.S. 506,511,514 (1937). 
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pational tax on bookies and a tax on yellow margarine were upheld by the 
Court in United States v. Kahriger 13 and McCray v. United States,214 respec-
tively, despite the fact that both taxes likely would generate little revenue. 
Finally, not only has the Court refused to draw distinctions based on a pur-
ported regulatory purpose of an exaction, it also has chosen to ignore the 
extent to which the exaction is effective in achieving that purpose. Accord-
ing to the Court, "[t]he power to tax may be exercised oppressively"215 and 
may "restrict or suppress the thing taxed."216 Congress is responsible to its 
constituents, not to the courts, for the manner in which it exercises its taxing 
power.217 
Critical examination into the nature of a statutory exaction for the 
most part ceased after the Court expanded the scope of the Commerce 
Clause in the wake of the New DeaJ.218 The significant cases in which the 
Court refused to countenance a provision as a proper exercise of the taxing 
power arose at a time during which the Commerce Clause resembled a sig-
nificant and vital limitation on federal power.219 As discussed above, Drexel 
Furniture struck down a tax on child labor that was enacted after the Court 
held that child labor was not a proper subject for federal regulation.220 In 
Hill v. Wallace, decided during the same term as Drexel Furniture, the 
Court invalidated a tax on commodities futures that were not sold on certain 
boards of trade because the Court characterized the taxes as an attempt to 
regulate activities over which the federal government had no authority.221 
For similar reasons, in the mid-1930s, the Court struck down an excise tax 
imposed on liquor dealers who violated state liquor laws and a tax on agri-
cultural producers that was intended to raise funds to implement an agricul-
tural subsidy program. 222 Once the Commerce Clause was interpreted as a 
213. 345 U.S. 22, 23, 28, 31 (1953). 
214. 195U.S.27,59(1904). 
215. /d. at 58 (quoting Spencer v. Merchant, 125 U.S. 345, 355 (1888)). 
216. Sonzinsky, 300 U.S. at 513. 
217. McCray, 195 U.S. at 58 (quoting Spencer, 125 U.S. at 355). 
218. See supra note 83. For a succinct overview of the Court's Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence during the New Deal era, see Louis J. Virelli III & David S. Leibowitz, "Fed-
eralism Whether They Want It or Not": The New Commerce Clause Doctrine and the Future 
of Federal Civil Rights Legislation After United States v. Morrison, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
926, 945-48 (200 1 ). 
219. Cj id. 
220. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
221. 259 u.s. 44, 45, 67-69 (1922). 
222. See United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 288-89, 295-96 (1935); United 
States v. Butler, 297 U.S. I, 55-56, 78 (1936). The Court, in Butler, made clear its disap-
proval of the achievement of an impermissible legislative objective by a coordinated tax and 
spend scheme: 
If the act before us is a proper exercise of the federal taxing power, evident-
ly the regulation of all industry throughout the United States may be accomplished 
by similar exercises of the same power. It would be possible to exact money from 
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grant of virtually limitless power over economic matters, the distinction 
between a tax and a penalty, for constitutional purposes, became irrele-
vant.223 
The Court's refusal to bless the individual mandate as a proper exer-
cise of the commerce power has made the tax versus penalty issue relevant 
again and will serve as a catalyst for challenges to exactions that Congress 
may choose to enact in similar form. As noted earlier, the Court did not 
provide much in the way of practical guidance for determining at which 
point an exaction crosses the line from a tax to a penalty.224 Several of the 
markers that the Court specified are easily avoided-for example, a scienter 
requirement, the use of nontax enforcement powers to induce the action 
desired by the legislation, and the use of agencies other than the IRS to en-
force the exaction.225 It is noteworthy that the Court examined whether the 
exaction in question "impose[d] an exceedingly heavy burden."226 This is 
pre-New Deal era language and contradicts the Court's own admonitions 
that the taxing power can be exercised oppressively.227 It is unclear whether 
this factor, by itself, can be outcome determinative. It is arguable that a pur-
ported tax imposed on the failure to act is, in reality, a penalty if the terms 
of the tax leave a person with no reasonable choice but to act. Take Chief 
Justice Roberts' approval of a hypothetical $50 tax imposed on owners of 
homes without energy efficient windows, for example.228 Assume that in-
one branch of an industry and pay it to another branch in every field of activity 
which lies within the province of the states. The mere threat of such a procedure 
might well induce the surrender of rights and the compliance with federal regula-
tion as the price of continuance in business. A few instances will illustrate the 
thought. 
Let us suppose Congress should determine that the farmer, the miner, or 
some other producer of raw materials is receiving too much for his products, with 
consequent depression of the processing industry and idleness of its employees. 
Though, by confession, there is no power vested in Congress to compel by statute a 
lowering of the prices of the raw material, the same result might be accomplished, 
if the questioned act be valid, by taxing the producer upon his output and appropri-
ating the proceeds to the processors, either with or without conditions imposed as 
the consideration for payment of the subsidy. 
/d. at 75. 
223. See generally Virelli & Leibowitz, supra note 218. For certain statutory purpos-
es, the distinction between a tax and a penalty had, and continues to have, relevance, as evi-
denced by the Court's holding with respect to the application of the Anti-Injunction Act. See 
supra notes 45-57 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Reorganized CF&I 
Fabricators ofUtah, Inc., 518 U.S. 213,220-26 (1996) (distinguishing taxes and penalties for 
purposes of bankruptcy law priorities). 
224. See supra text accompanying notes 109-23. 
225. See supra notes 74, 84-91 and accompanying text. 
226. Nat'l Fed'n oflndep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2595 (2012). 
227. See supra notes 215 and accompanying text. 
228. See supra text accompanying note 97. For a discussion of whether such a tax 
might be a direct tax that must be apportioned, see infra text accompanying note 305. 
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stead of a $50 tax, the tax equaled or exceeded the cost of such windows. 
No reasonable individual could resist the purchase of the windows under 
such circumstances. 229 
Another factor that may be relevant in classifying an exaction is 
whether the action compelled is one that most, if not all, persons subject to 
the exaction would be expected to enter into regardless of the exaction. For 
example, instead of a tax on the failure to purchase windows, assume that 
the tax is imposed on the failure to purchase energy efficient light bulbs. It 
is likely that virtually everyone subject to the tax would have purchased 
light bulbs at some point during the taxable year. Therefore, a tax on the 
failure to purchase energy efficient light bulbs reasonably can be recast as 
an excise tax on the purchase of other types of light bulbs-a tax that is 
certainly permissible. Another relevant factor is the time at which the tax is 
imposed. A tax on the failure to purchase windows or, for example, a tax on 
the failure to purchase a particular type of automobile, that is imposed only 
upon the purchase of a nonconforming item is a fundamentally different 
type of tax than a tax that is imposed simply on the failure to purchase the 
required items. The former is the equivalent of an excise tax on items that 
the statute disfavors, but it does not compel the engagement in commerce, 
while the latter tax is compulsive. 
A strong argument can be made that a tax that compels its subjects to 
engage in commerce because its terms leave one with no reasonable choice 
but to act can be interpreted, like the child labor tax, as an attempt to cir-
cumvent Commerce Clause restrictions. Alternatively, such a tax can be 
seen as nothing more than a direct means to an end that is achievable 
through other, more indirect, means. As illustrated earlier, Congress can 
compel action by raising tax rates and providing a large credit, deduction, or 
direct subsidy for engaging in a favored activity. 230 I doubt there would be 
any constitutionally-based objection to the provision of a 200% tax credit 
for the purchase of energy efficient windows that was funded through an 
increase in tax rates. This sort of provision should be enough to compel 
reasonable people to purchase such windows as effectively as a direct tax 
imposed on the failure to purchase such windows. The Court, at least based 
on the language in the opinion, does not appear inclined to examine an ex-
action in a form other than the form used by Congress. The Court looked 
beyond the formalism of an exaction's label but it did not view the method 
by which Congress chose to achieve its objective as a formality. It is likely 
that the Court will examine a tax on the failure to act on its own terms. Ac-
229. Although, for most taxpayers, the cost of health insurance will exceed the 
amount of the shared responsibility payment imposed by § 5000A, for higher income taxpay-
ers the exaction will be comparable to the cost of insurance. See supra notes 33-38 and ac-
companying text. 
230. See supra notes 175-81 and accompanying text. 
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cordingly, the reasoning in Drexel Furniture and the other cases that 
reached similar results will provide a check on egregious exercises of the 
taxing power that manifest themselves in similar form. Justice Cardozo not-
ed that "motive or temptation" is not equivalent to "coercion" and that the 
law is guided by the assumption that the "freedom of the will" provides 
solutions to problems.231 Compulsion should be the apotheosis of a penalty. 
3. Structural Constraints on the Taxing Power-The Direct Tax 
Clauses 
Congress's power to tax is expansive, but it is not unlimited. In addi-
tion to the constitutional limitations applicable to the exercise of any federal 
power, there are structural limitations specific to the taxing power.232 First, 
certain taxes must be uniform. Congress has the power "[t]o lay and collect 
Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises .... but all Duties, Imposts, and Excis-
es shall be uniform throughout the United States."233 The precise contours of 
the uniformity requirement was subject to some debate during the first cen-
tury of the republic, but it now refers simply to geographic uniformity-
federal tax rates must be the same throughout the United States.234 The uni-
formity requirement rarely surfaces as a point of contention, perhaps due to 
the political difficulties that would be encountered in enacting a provision 
that overtly disfavored a particular geographic region, but on occasion the 
issue does arise. 235 Duties and imposts are taxes imposed on imported 
goods-in modem parlance, tariffs.236 According to one scholar, the framers 
may have limited the term "excises" to taxes on whiskey.237 However, the 
term came to govern an exceedingly broad array of exactions, including 
inheritance taxes, gift taxes, the corporate income tax, and the individual 
231. See Chas. C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548,573,589-90 (1937). 
232. See infra text accompanying notes 233-44. 
233. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
234. Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 82-106 (1900). The language of the Sixteenth 
Amendment could be interpreted to excuse income taxes from the uniformity requirement. 
See supra text accompanying note 243. However, the Court did not subscribe to such an 
interpretation. 
235. See, e.g., United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74, 75, 85-86 (1983) (stating that 
an exemption from an oil profits tax for certain Alaskan oil did not provide Alaska with an 
undue preference over other states). One scholar opined that the uniformity requirement 
rivals, in its neglect, the reference to "Letters of Marque and Reprisal" in art. I, § 8, cl. I. See 
Erik M. Jensen, The Taxing Power, the Sixteenth Amendment, and the Meaning of "In-
comes," 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1057, 1065 (2001) (citing U.S. CONST. art I,§ 8, cl. !.). 
236. See Calvin H. Johnson, Apportionment of Direct Taxes: The Foul-Up in the 
Core of the Constitution, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 47 (1998). 
237. /d. at 60-61. 
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income tax.238 By the time of the New Deal, the Court defined the term ex-
pansively as an exaction "imposed upon a particular use of property or the 
exercise of a single power over property incidental to ownership."239 
Second, Congress is expressly prohibited from imposing any taxes on 
exports or any duties on ships that depart from a port in one state and arrive 
at a port in another state.24° Finally, capitation, or other direct taxes must be 
apportioned among the states according to population.241 However, taxes on 
incomes may be imposed without apportionment among the states and 
without regard to population, although they must be imposed uniformly. 242 
Therefore, certain taxes-duties, imposts, excises, and income taxes-must 
be uniform, and direct taxes must be apportioned. With one exception, a tax 
cannot be both uniform and apportioned according to population.243 As a 
result, depending on the type of tax in question, it must be either uniform or 
apportioned. 
Whether a tax is a direct tax subject to the apportionment requirement 
was an issue that appeared to be settled. As discussed subsequently and as 
noted by Chief Justice Roberts, direct taxes have been confined to capitation 
taxes, taxes on real property, and taxes on personal property.244 However, 
the Court's imprimatur on taxes imposed on the failure to act has unsettled 
the issue somewhat. The Court's rather prosaic treatment of this issue leaves 
some doubt as to whether future exactions taking similar form are immune 
to apportionment challenges. 
238. See infra notes 281-82 and accompanying text. The Court, in Hylton v. United 
States, believed that the taxing power was flexible enough to support exactions that did not 
fit the traditional notions of direct taxes, duties, imposts, and excises. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) I71, 
173-74 (1796) (opinion of Chase, J.). 
239. Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124, 136 (1929). 
240. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 cis. 5-6. The Court has interpreted the prohibition on 
laying taxes on exports to prohibit Congress from imposing a tax on bills of lading for export 
items, a stamp tax on export insurance, and a tax on charter ships carrying export cargo. See 
Fairbank v. United States, 181 U.S. 283, 294 (1901); Thames & Mersey Marine Ins. Co. v. 
United States, 237 U.S. 19, 25-27 (19I5); United States v. Hvoslef, 237 U.S. I, I7-18 
(1915). One limitation on Congress's power to tax is, thankfully, truly a dead letter. A tax or 
duty on imported slaves cannot exceed $IO per slave. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 9, cl. I. 
241. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4. 
242. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. The Sixteenth Amendment did not create a separate 
classification for the income tax that was subject neither to apportionment nor to the uni-
formity requirement. See id. Income taxes are subject to the uniformity requirement. See 
Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. I, 18 (1916). 
243. See infra note 253 and accompanying text. 
244. See supra note 98 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 279-83 and ac-
companying text. 
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A majority of the Court held that the individual mandate was not a di-
rect tax and, therefore, not subject to apportionment_245 However, the Court 
never made explicit whether the individual mandate is an income tax or 
another form of excise tax. Chief Justice Roberts held that two factors dis-
tinguished the mandate from a capitation tax-the fact that it is determined 
by income and the fact that it is triggered by the failure to obtain insur-
ance. 246 One factor suggests the mandate is an income tax while the other 
suggests it is an excise tax. The Chief Justice seemingly approved a hypo-
thetical $50 tax imposed on taxpayers who own homes without energy effi-
cient windows because such a tax is adjusted based on income and filing 
status. 247 This suggests that his hypothetical tax is an income tax, but read-
ing more into this hypothetical is mere speculation. In fact, this hypothetical 
tax, without the income and filing status caveats, appears remarkably simi-
lar to a tax on real property, a direct tax.248 
If a tax is not a direct tax subject to apportionment because it is an in-
come tax, then the question of whether a tax that is imposed on the failure to 
act that does not reference income needing to be apportioned has not been 
answered. If the Court believed that the individual mandate is a form of 
excise tax regardless of how it is calculated, then the apportionment issue is 
generally, but not entirely, moot.249 Regardless of whether the individual 
mandate was seen by the Court as an excise tax or an income tax, it is quite 
possible that the aggressive imposition of taxes on the failure to act could 
implicate the apportionment requirement. 
The framers' purpose in subjecting direct taxes to apportionment is not 
clear and, therefore, the scope of the term "other direct [t]axmso is uncertain. 
The phrase "[c]apitation, or other direct, [t]ax"251 indicates that the framers 
intended that some taxes other than capitation taxes would be subject to 
apportionment. Keep in mind that, with one exception, a tax is either uni-
form or apportioned, but not both. In order to apportion taxes according to 
population, the tax base, tax rates, or both would have to vary in order to 
synchronize revenue with population. The only exception is a lump-sum 
capitation tax. A fixed tax imposed on all individuals will be both uniform 
and, obviously, apportioned according to population. Apportioned taxes are 
difficult to implement and politically toxic because they will vary facially 
from state to state. The fact that a constitutional amendment was necessary 
245. Nat'l Fed'n oflndep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2599 (2012). The dissent 
believed that this issue did not receive the attention it deserved. See id. at 2655 (Scalia, Ken-
nedy, Thomas, Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
246. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
247. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2597-98 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.). 
248. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
249. See infra notes 302-06 and accompanying text. 
250. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4. 
251. /d. 
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in order to implement an income tax after the Court held such a tax to be 
direct attests to the fact that apportionment is a political nonstarter.252 At 
present, there are no apportioned taxes in effect in the United States and the 
last enactment of a direct tax took place in 1861.253 
In general terms, there are two schools of thought regarding the direct 
tax clauses. Professor Erik Jensen is perhaps the leading proponent of the 
view that the constitutional text and the intent of the framers support the 
continued vitality of the clauses and that the courts have been remiss in ig-
noring them.254 A second school of thought that includes Professors Calvin 
Johnson and Bruce Ackerman believes that the direct tax clauses were the 
result of the compromises made by the framers with respect to slavery and 
were never intended to be applicable to most forms oftaxation.255 Therefore, 
the clauses rightly have been ignored. 
Professor Jensen believes that the framers understood that the burden 
of indirect taxes such as excise taxes was "shiftable."256 In other words, such 
taxes are ultimately borne by the consumer in the form of higher prices. 257 
Moreover, such taxes also have inherent prophylactic properties because 
repressive taxes could be avoided by the reduction or cessation of the activi-
ty to which the tax applied.258 In contrast, the burden of direct taxes falls on 
the individuals on whom they are imposed and cannot be shifted or avoid-
ed. 259 Direct taxes are also regressive. 260 These factors contributed to their 
unpopularity. In addition, the apportionment requirement was a mechanism 
used by the framers to reduce the possibility of taxes that are directed at 
particular sections of the country and the taxation of slaves was but a part of 
their concern in this regard.261 Professor Jensen believes that the universe of 
direct taxes was understood to include, in addition to capitation taxes, all 
252. See infra notes 283-85 and accompanying text. 
253. Erik M. Jensen, Interpreting the Sixteenth Amendment (by Way of the Direct-Tax 
Clauses), 21 CONST. COMMENT. 355, 357 & n.7 (2004). 
254. See infra notes 256--65 and accompanying text. 
255. See infra notes 266--72 and accompanying text. 
256. Jensen, supra note 235, at 1075. Professor Johnson does not agree that this is a 
distinguishing characteristic of indirect taxes. Calvin H. Johnson, Fixing the Constitutional 
Absurdity of the Apportionment of Direct Tax, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 295, 319-24 (2004). 
257. See Jensen, supra note 235, at 1075. Although this property is not universal, the 
framers understood this feature as a general characteristic of indirect taxes. See Erik M. 
Jensen, The Apportionment of "Direct Taxes": Are Consumption Taxes Constitutional?, 97 
COLUM. L. REV. 2334, 2393-96, 2394 n.325 (1997). 
258. See Jensen, supra note 235, at 1076. 
259. !d. at 1075-77; Jensen, supra note 257, at 2396. 
260. See Jensen, supra note 257, at 2391. Regressive taxes are taxes that, when ex-
pressed as a percentage of income, are greater as income declines. See id. The U.S. income 
tax system is, for the most part, progressive in that higher tax rates are applied as income 
increases. 
261. Jensen, supra note 253, at 3 72. Slaves often were taxed as part of levies imposed 
on real estate but were not taxed independently of the real estate. !d. 
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taxes other than those understood to be indirect taxes. 262 He also believes 
that to limit direct taxes to capitation taxes that are by their very nature ap-
portioned, as suggested by Professors Johnson and Ackerman, is simplis-
tic.263 At the time of the Constitution's ratification, capitation taxes were not 
self-apportioning because of the three-fifths rule for the counting of slaves 
for apportionment purposes.264 Moreover, there is no requirement that capi-
tation taxes be imposed as a lump sum without any exclusion or adjust-
ments.265 
Professor Johnson asserts that the apportionment requirement was in-
tended to link the burden of taxation with representation and wealth.266 The 
apportionment requirement extended the three-fifths compromise with re-
spect to slaves' effect on representation to taxation.267 Moreover, the appor-
tionment requirement may have been a practical compromise to avoid the 
necessity of property appraisals and, perhaps, as a disincentive for the South 
to add to the slave population.268 According to Professor Johnson, all taxes 
except imposts were considered direct taxes.269 The framers divided the uni-
verse of taxes into those that are subject to uniformity and those subject to 
apportionment. 270 Only taxes that can be apportioned practically should be 
considered direct taxes. 271 Professor Ackerman subscribes to this narrow 
view of direct taxes and asserts further that the textual reference to direct 
taxes other than capitation taxes was meant to constrain the federal govern-
ment in enforcing state requisition obligations under the Articles of Confed-
eration.272 
In summary, the Jensen school of thought believes that the nature of a 
tax exaction should be examined and taxes that do not contain the character-
istics of indirect taxes should be subject to apportionment.273 The fact that 
the requirement to apportion a tax causes a tax to face virtually insurmount-
able practical and political difficulties is of no moment.274 The direct tax 
clauses were meant as a substantive limitation on the federal taxing pow-
262. See Jensen, supra note 257, at 2390, 2395. 
263. See infra text accompanying notes 266-75. 
264. See Jensen, supra note 257, at 2392. 
265. See id. at 2392. 
266. Johnson, supra note 256, at 300-06; see also Johnson, supra note 236, at 30-34. 
267. See Johnson, supra note 256, at 304-05. 
268. See id. at 302, 307. Slaves were often taxed in conjunction with levies on real 
property. See Jensen, supra note 253, at 372. 
269. Johnson, supra note 256, at 314-15; Johnson, supra note 236, at 46-55. 
270. Johnson, supra note 256, at 314-19. 
271. Id.; see also Bruce Ackerman, Taxation and the Constitution, 99 COLUM. L. 
REV. I, 23 (1999)(quoting Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 174 (1796)(opinion 
of Chase, J.)). 
272. Ackerman, supra note 271, at 13. 
273. See supra text accompanying note 262. 
274. See supra notes 263-68 and accompanying text. 
The Pundits Doth Protest Too Much 1237 
er.275 The Johnson-Ackerman school of thought posits that the direct tax 
clauses merely reflect a truism-a direct tax was one that practically could 
be apportioned-and their purpose was inextricably linked to the slavery 
compromises.276 Accordingly, except for capitation taxes and property taxes, 
the direct tax clauses are dead letters. It is questionable whether textual pro-
visions should be ignored because they were the result of compromises over 
the issue of slavery. For example, the Electoral College provisions are not 
ignored-much as we may desire to do so.277 Nonetheless, the Court, with a 
few detours along the way, has leaned strongly toward the Johnson-
Ackerman approach to interpreting the direct tax clauses. 
As noted by Chief Justice Roberts, direct taxes are limited to capita-
tion taxes and taxes imposed directly on real and personal property.278 In 
Hylton v. United States, the Court, holding that a tax on carriages was not a 
direct tax, stated that "[t]he rule of apportionment is only to be adopted in 
such cases where it can reasonably apply" and limited apportionment to 
capitation taxes and taxes on real property.279 The Court later held that in-
heritance taxes and gift taxes were not direct taxes but instead taxes on the 
succession ofproperty.280 Likewise, the Civil War income tax and the corpo-
rate income tax were held to have been excise.taxes.281 
The Court, however, in the two Pollock cases that eventually led to the 
ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment, held that a tax on income from 
real property and personal property was a direct tax on that property, and 
therefore a direct tax subject to the apportionment requirement.282 Although 
275. Ackerman, supra note 271, at 13. 
276. See supra notes 266--72 and accompanying text. 
277. The Electoral College is also a product of the three-fifths slavery compromise. 
Because each state has a number of electors determined by the sum of the number of its 
representatives and senators, the southern states were assured that their slave populations 
would increase their political influence in presidential elections. U.S. CONST. art. II, § I. 
278. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
279. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 174-75 (Chase, J.) (emphasis omitted). 
280. Scholey v. Rew, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 331, 344, 346-49 (1875); Knowlton v. 
Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 81-82 (1900); Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124, 134-35, 137-38 
(1929). 
281. Springer v. United States, I 02 U.S. 586, 598-99 (1881 ); Flint v. Stone Tracy 
Co., 220 U.S. 107, 150-51 (1911). Flint was decided after Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust 
Co. and before the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment. The Court interpreted the corpo-
rate income tax as a tax on the privilege of doing business in corporate form. Flint, 220 U.S. 
at 151. 
282. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. (Pollock I), 157 U.S. 429, 580, 581-83 
(1895) (holding that a tax on income derived from real property was a direct tax), overruled 
by South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 524 (1988); Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. 
(Pollock II), 158 U.S. 601, 618 (1895) (holding that a tax on income derived from personal 
property was a direct tax). The Court, in the earlier Pollock case, struck down a tax on in-
come from state and local securities on federalism grounds, a decision that was later over-
ruled. Pollock I, 157 U.S. at 584-86. However, it did not decide the issue of whether a tax on 
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these decisions did not call into question whether a tax on earned income 
was indirect, they erected an insurmountable impediment to the burgeoning 
Progressive movement's aim to tax the vast accumulations of wealth that 
industrialization had made possible. These cases were very controversial. So 
controversial, in fact, that Justice Harlan opined that the decisions "will 
become as hateful with the American people as the Dred Scott case."283 In 
1913, the Sixteenth Amendment was ratified, which enables Congress to tax 
incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment.284 
The debate between Professor Jensen and Professors Johnson and 
Ackerman extends to the effect that the Sixteenth Amendment has on the 
meaning of the direct tax clauses. Professor Johnson believes that "[t]he 
Sixteenth Amendment came to bury Pollock, not to praise it."285 His inter-
pretation, shared by Professor Ackerman, of the political debate surrounding 
the proposal and ratification of the amendment indicated that the measure 
was intended to repudiate Pollock and put an end to assertions that various 
forms of tax are direct.286 In contrast, Professor Jensen believes that anum-
ber of Congressmen did not think that Pollock was indefensible and that the 
Sixteenth Amendment represented a tacit admission that income taxes were 
direct taxes, thereby necessitating a constitutional amendment for their im-
position. 287 The amendment's language, on its face, merely empowers the 
federal government to levy income taxes without apportionment, nothing 
more and nothing less.288 This was the effect given to the amendment by the 
Court in Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. 289 
income from such securities was a direct tax. /d. at 579, 586. This issue was decided in the 
subsequent Pollock case. Pollock II, 158 U.S. at 628. 
283. Calvin H. Johnson, Purging Out Pollock: The Constitutionality of Federal 
Wealth or Sales Taxes, TAX NOTES, Dec. 30, 2002, at 1723, 1730 (citations omitted). 
284. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. 
285. Johnson, supra note 256, at 350. 
286. See id. at 347-50; Ackerman, supra note 272, at 33-34, 38. 
287. See Jensen, supra note 253, at 392-93; Johnson, supra note 256, at 347. 
288. Jensen, supra note 253, at 392-98. 
289. The Court explained as follows: 
[T]he Amendment contains nothing repudiating or challenging the ruling in the 
Pollock Case that the word direct had a broader significance since it embraced also 
taxes levied directly on personal property because of its ownership, and therefore 
the Amendment at least impliedly makes such wider significance a part of the Con-
stitution-a condition which clearly demonstrates that the purpose was not to 
change the existing interpretation except to the extent necessary to accomplish the 
result intended, that is, the prevention of the resort to the sources from which a 
taxed income was derived in order to cause a direct tax on the income to be a direct 
tax on the source itself and thereby to take an income tax out of the class of excis-
es, duties and imposts and place it in the class of direct taxes. 
240 U.S. I, 19 (1916). 
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In Eisner v. Macomber, the Court did not believe that the Sixteenth 
Amendment gutted the direct tax clauses.290 In that case the Court held that a 
proportional stock dividend was not income because such a dividend merely 
retains the shareholders' status quo ante ownership of the corporation.291 
The Court proceeded to classify such a tax as a tax on capital and, therefore, 
a direct tax: 
That Congress has power to tax shareholders upon their property interests in the 
stock of corporations is beyond question; and that such interests might be valued in 
view of the condition of the company, including its accumulated and undivided 
profits, is equally clear. But that this would be taxation of property because of 
ownership, and hence would require apportionment under the provisions of the 
Constitution, is settled beyond peradventure by previous decisions of this court.292 
The Court, in Weiss v. Stearn, cited approvingly to Eisner in holding 
that the receipt of stock by shareholders in a reorganization transaction was 
not income. 293 
As previously discussed, Chief Justice Roberts stated that direct taxes 
are limited to capitation taxes and taxes imposed upon real and personal 
property.294 Obviously, the individual mandate could not be considered a tax 
on real or personal property. However, the Court's dismissal of the individ-
ual mandate as a capitation tax raises more questions than it answers. More-
over, the rather cursory examination that the Court gave this issue, as noted 
by the dissent, leaves open the possibility that future enactments of this sort 
290. 252 u.s. 189, 206 (1920). 
291. !d. at 210-13. The holding in Eisner has been codified, albeit with numerous 
exceptions to prevent abuse. See I.R.C. § 305 (CCH 2012). It is not so obvious that a propor-
tional stock dividend is not income. In the case that the stock held by the recipients of the 
dividend has appreciated in value, it is plausible that the receipt of the stock dividend is a 
realization event sufficient to tax, to the extent of the value of the dividend, the appreciation 
in the shares. 
292. Eisner, 252 U.S. at 217. Justice Holmes, however, believed that the Sixteenth 
Amendment did more than just allow for the imposition of a nonapportioned income tax: 
The known purpose of this Amendment was to get rid of nice questions as to what 
might be direct taxes, and I cannot doubt that most people not lawyers would sup-
pose when they voted for it that they put a question like the present to rest. I am of 
opinion that the Amendment justifies the tax. 
/d. at 220 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
293. 265 U.S. 242, 253-54 (1924). The facts of this case would support the assertion 
that the consideration received by the shareholders was income more so than the facts in 
Eisner. The shareholders received shares in a new corporation and, therefore, could be con-
sidered to have realized income from a discrete and measurable transaction. See id. at 244-
45. The current tax treatment of corporate reorganizations is complex, but the receipt of stock 
in corporate reorganizations is taxable unless the transaction meets various statutory re-
quirements. See generally I.R.C. §§ 354, 355, 368. Eisner was also cited in Edwards v. Cuba 
Railroad Co., in which the Court held that subsidies paid by the Cuban government to subsi-
dize construction and reduce rates were not income. 268 U.S. 628, 629-30, 633 (1925). This 
sort of transaction is now dealt with statutorily. See I.R.C. § 118. 
294. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
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could be challenged as enactments of a direct tax subject to apportion-
ment.295 It is not clear whether the Court believed that the individual man-
date is not a direct tax subject to apportionment because it is an income tax 
or because it is an excise tax irrespective of the method in which it is calcu-
lated. As noted earlier, the Court appeared to suggest that it viewed the 
mandate as an income tax. 296 
However, the Court also stated that the individual mandate was not a 
capitation tax because "[c]apitations are taxes paid by every person, 'with-
out regard to property, profession, or any other circumstance.' The whole 
point of the shared responsibility payment is that it is triggered by specific 
circumstances--earning a certain amount of income but not obtaining health 
insurance. "297 This language implies that the individual mandate is not a 
capitation tax regardless of its reference to income because "any other cir-
cumstance" should include the failure to obtain insurance standing alone. 
The Court's cursory analysis in this respect-four paragraphs in the majori-
ty opinion-fails to provide any principled guidance for determining wheth-
er future enactments of this sort are direct taxes.298 
Surely, the definition put forth by the Court cannot be applied literally 
without nuance. Taken literally, this definition would exclude from the cat-
egory of capitation taxes a $100 tax imposed on all individuals who fail to 
take a ride in the space shuttle. Moreover, it is not necessary to resort to 
such an absurd example to evidence the Court's unsatisfactory analysis of 
capitation taxes. For example, a tax of $100 imposed on every individual 
except full-time students not over eighteen years of age is a capitation tax 
despite the fact that the tax is not paid by every person regardless of any 
other circumstance.299 Alternatively, a tax of $100 imposed on every indi-
vidual except those individuals whose income is below some statutorily 
defined poverty threshold strongly resembles a capitation tax.300 Although 
295. See supra text accompanying note I 00. 
296. See supra notes 247--49 and accompanying text. 
297. Nat' I Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2599 (quoting Hylton v. 
United States, 3 U.S. (3 DaB.) 171, 175 (Chase, J.)). 
298. !d. at 2598-99. 
299. The township in which this author resides imposes a per capita tax on each resi-
dent or inhabitant of the township over the age of twenty-one. UPPER PROVIDENCE TWP., PA, 
CODIFIED ORDINANCES pt. 8, tit. 4, ch. 880, § 880.01 (2011). It defies logic that a similar 
federal exaction would fail to constitute a capitation tax solely because it does not apply to 
individuals that are under the age of twenty-two. To consider such a tax an excise tax im-
posed on the privilege of living beyond the age of twenty-one stretches the concept of an 
excise beyond a11 reasonable bounds. 
300. State and local governments that impose per capita taxes often exempt from such 
taxes individuals whose income is below a defined threshold. See, e.g., 53 PA. CONS. STAT. 
ANN. § 6924.301.1(b) (West 2011) (authorizing political subdivisions to exempt individuals 
with annual income below $12,000 from per capita or head taxes). 
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the tax is excused for persons of a certain income level, its amount is not 
determined by income for anyone. 
If a tax is not a capitation or other direct tax then it must be either an 
income tax or another form of excise tax. Let us assume for the moment that 
the mandate is considered an income tax because it is determined by refer-
ence to income and family status. The mandate amount, however, will be 
determined by income for only a subset of individuals to whom it applies. 
For many individuals, the mandate will be a flat amount.301 Is an exaction an 
income tax if anyone's liability is determined by income? It strains credulity 
to classify an exaction that is fixed for all but a small number of individuals 
as an income tax. 
Alternatively, the Court may have considered the individual mandate 
as an excise tax that is permissible regardless of whether its amount is 
based, in any part, on incomes. Unfortunately, the Court failed to explain 
just how this type of tax is an excise tax. Notwithstanding the expansive 
scope that the term "excise" has taken on, to fit a tax on the failure to pur-
chase something under this label requires some explanation. Does a tax that 
is imposed on the failure to purchase insurance constitute a tax "imposed 
upon a particular use of property or the exercise of a single power over 
property incidental to ownership"?302 I guess it is possible to squeeze the tax 
within the scope of an excise tax by deeming the failure to purchase insur-
ance as a tax imposed on the power to retain one's assets for alternative 
uses. This is a rather odd, but possible, way to interpret such a tax. Alterna-
tively, the tax can be interpreted as an excise tax on the economic decision 
to self-insure. However, if this interpretation of the failure to obtain insur-
ance is tenable, then the mandate should have passed muster under the 
commerce power.303 Perhaps the Court has decoupled excise taxes from any 
connection to privileges, transactions, or other affirmative deployment of 
assets so that they encompass taxes on the failure to behave in a prescribed 
way. If so, it should have said as much. In any event, such an expansive 
view of excise power will not settle all disputes. 
Let me go back again to the Chief Justice's example of a $50 tax im-
posed on the owners of homes without energy efficient windows. 304 In the 
example, the tax is paid with an income tax return and is adjusted based on 
income and filing status.305 Assume that the tax is $50 without adjustment 
for the other factors. I fail to see how such a tax could be considered as any-
301. See supra notes 27-38 and accompanying text. 
302. See Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124, 136 (1929); see also supra text ac-
companying note 239. 
303. See Nat' I Fed'n oflndep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2589 n.6 (dismissing 
the characterization of the failure to obtain insurance as an affirmative act of self-insuring). 
304. /d. at 2597-98; see also supra text accompanying note 97. 
305. See supra text accompanying note 247. 
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thing other than a tax on real property-a direct tax. Surely, a direct tax on 
realty does not have to tax all realty. Just why the Chief Justice sanctioned 
such a tax is not clear. Apparently, it was because it was income adjusted. 
I tend to believe that future exactions of this type will be subject to 
challenge in several circumstances. First, nonincome-based exactions that 
reach all but an insignificant number of individuals will be challenged as 
capitation taxes. This will provide a check on Congress's use of the taxing 
power to get too far ahead of the people in economic and social matters. For 
example, assume that Congress wishes to prod people to become more edu-
cated about some perceived social ill and enacts a $20 tax on the failure to 
take a $400 self-study course that deals with the matter in question. Assume 
further that the country does not share Congress's concern and, consequent-
ly, the tax is incurred by virtually all individuals. The combination of the 
small amount of the exaction and the public's apathy concerning the social 
ill in question assures that such a tax, in its effect, will bear a striking re-
semblance to a capitation tax and, perhaps, be subject to challenge as 
such.306 
Second, flat taxes that are imposed on the failure to take action to im-
prove or modify property will be subject to challenge as direct taxes im-
posed on property not so improved or modified. Finally, the status of an 
exaction as an income tax may be challenged if the exaction is, in fact, de-
termined by income for an insignificant number of people. Such a challenge 
will leave the exaction vulnerable to the objections discussed in the preced-
ing examples. 
In effect, the Court narrowly defined capitation and other direct taxes 
and then concluded that any exaction not captured by that narrow definition 
is an indirect tax. I am not asserting that the individual mandate is a direct 
tax. Certainly a sufficient number of people will be exempt from the tax to 
deny, quite reasonably, its status as a capitation tax. Alternatively, a reason-
able conclusion could be drawn that the mandate is sufficiently tied to in-
come to classify it as an income tax. The mandate is a relatively easy case. 
It is quite possible that future mandates will be categorically dismissed from 
the universe of direct taxes regardless of their application and effect. The 
Federal Circuit, for example, has interpreted the direct tax clauses to apply 
only to broad-based property taxes and not to property taxes of more limited 
scope.307 The Court ultimately may conclude that only taxes that, on their 
306. If such a tax is imposed on all individuals, then the tax will be self-apportioning 
and, thus, permissible whether or not it is considered a direct tax. However, if such a tax is 
imposed on households or contains exemptions for children, for example, it would no longer 
be self-apportioning. 
307. The Federal Circuit narrowly defined direct taxes to include broad-based taxes 
imposed on personal property but not narrowly tailored property assessments. Union Electric 
Co. v. United States, 363 F.3d 1292, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The issue before the court was 
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face, are either universally applicable capitations or broad-based property 
taxes constitute direct taxes and that mandates, regardless of their impact, 
do not fit within this category of tax. However, it did not do so in this case 
and perhaps it will not, because "[t]he law is not indifferent to considera-
tions of degree."308 The Court's failure to probe the boundaries of direct 
taxes in this case is understandable. After all, this case was seen, first and 
foremost, as a test of the commerce power. The attention given to the taxing 
power was focused on the tax versus penalty debate. The direct tax issue 
appears to have been a collateral issue. 
CONCLUSION 
The possibility that the Court's approval of the individual mandate 
will lead to a Congress run-amok, intoxicated by its power to tax, is negated 
by the newfound vigor of Drexel Furniture, traditional constitutional safe-
guards, and the potential resurrection of the direct tax clauses as limiting 
principles. More importantly, however, are the political che~s on Congress. 
As previously noted, the transparency of failure to act taxes will result in 
more, not less, scrutiny of the wisdom of similar exactions-as evidenced 
both by the unprecedented public attention focused on the individual man-
date and by the dearth of intrusive mandates imposed at the state level. 309 
Moreover, taxes imposed on the failure to act are often difficult to enforce, a 
fact that should diminish any proclivity that Congress may have to enact 
such taxes.310 I believe that most people would agree that the tax law suffers 
the validity of a special assessment imposed on domestic utility companies that purchased 
government enriched uranium: 
[T]he tax at issue here is not a general tax on the whole of one's personal property 
or even a tax on a broad class of personal property. Rather, it is a carefully tailored 
tax, like the one sustained in Hylton and other cases, levied upon only one particu-
lar kind of personal property, government-enriched uranium. It is therefore not a 
direct tax. 
!d. at 1294-95, 1302. The court also held that the tax at issue was an excise tax: 
Also, the tax here on the ownership of government-enriched uranium purchased di-
rectly or indirectly from the government is indistinguishable from taxes on carriag-
es, tobacco, yachts and other types of personal property that have long been ac-
cepted as excise taxes. The EPACT tax is not therefore a direct tax, and does not 
require apportionment. 
!d. at 1302, 1304. 
308. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 554 (1935) 
(Cardozo, J., concurring). 
309. See supra notes 184-91 and accompanying text. I know of no state impositions 
that can be used as evidence that this case will usher in a parade of ridiculous mandates. I 
have not scoured the various state tax codes but the fact that no such exactions come to mind 
is evidence of the dearth of such transactions. It may very well be possible that various states 
are limited in their exercise of their taxing powers in such fashion by their own constitutions. 
310. See supra text accompanying note 166-74. 
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from a lack of respect due to, in part, the abundance of noncompliance with 
the tax law as it is. One would hope that Congress would avoid actions that 
invite further noncompliance. 
